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ABSTRACT
Renewable energy technologies can significantly reduce fossil fuel consumption and greenhouse gas
emissions associated with the energy sector. In US, both federal and state governments have implemented
numerous policies and programs to support these technologies. But these policies require a substantial
amount of public spending. In this study, an integrated model to identify optimal subsidy schedules for
clean energy technologies that maximize social benefits less subsidy costs is developed. The national
flexible optimal subsidy schedule for residential solar PV begins at $585/kW and declines to zero in 14
years. An alternative analytical model is also presented to analyze technological features affecting subsidy
design. Three important factors determining the social benefits of subsidizing the use of clean energy
technology are examined: the price sensitivity of adoption, induced cost reductions through learning, and
environmental benefits. Results show that optimal subsidy schedules for utility wind are roughly constant
over time. In contrast, optimal residential solar subsidies either decline over time or are not desirable
(subsidy of zero). The results imply that the optimal subsidy for utility wind is justified mainly through
the direct environmental benefits, unlike residential solar PV, in which indirect technological progress
benefits primarily justify the subsidy. The effects of multiple adoption modeling and parameter choice
alternatives on optimal subsidy design are also explored. The study considers three different model
structures for rooftop solar adoption consisting of a combination of single and multiple explanatory
variables. Results show that the scale of sensitivity of optimal subsidy designs to technology learning rate
assumptions depends on the model choice. This dissertation shows that analytical inputs can be
instrumental in informing policymakers deciding on subsidy schedules promoting renewable
technologies. These tools can integrate environmental benefits and the complex interaction between the
subsidy, diffusion patterns, and technology cost trajectories to ensure socially optimal policy designs.

iii

Acknowledgments
I am deeply grateful to my Ph.D. advisors: Dr. Eric Hittinger, Dr. Qing Miao, and Dr. Eric Williams.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to be part of your research team. I am always indebted for the
continuous advice, support, and encouragement throughout my Ph.D. study. Your guidance and valuable
comments have immensely helped me find my way as a researcher. I would also like to express my
gratitude for financially assisting me with my study here and the funding for attending conferences.
Words cannot fully describe the kindness and support you showed me throughout the years. Thank you,
and I will always look up to you as a researcher and as a person.
I want to express my profound appreciation to my research committee member, Dr. Nathan Williams,
for being an integral part of my Ph.D. journey. Thank you for sharing your knowledge and expertise.
Your insightful comments, feedback, and questions have been an exceptional input to my dissertation
work.
I am extremely grateful to Dr. Callie Babbitt. Thank you for the guidance, career advice, and teaching
me the fundamentals of effective scientific communications. I would also like to thank all GIS faculty
members for educating me about the foundations of sustainability that led me to this stage. I extend my
heartfelt appreciation to GIS staff assistant Angelique Armstrong for the continuous follow-ups and
administrative paperwork and for helping me run things smoothly. Many thanks to fellow students for
making my time at GIS enjoyable.
I could not have undertaken this journey without my family's constant moral support, encouragement,
and unconditional love. Thank you for being there all the time. My parents, Berhanu Tibebu and
Asselefech Desalegn, my sisters Tigist and Kidist, my brother Yohannes, Biruk Tibebu, Medrek
W/Meskel, and Berhanu Desta, I cannot thank you all enough.
I want to thank my dear friend Tigist Mussa whom I have learned a lot from, and special friends I met
at RIT, Anupama Garani, Ajeeta Khatri, and Ruiwen Fan, for the amazing experience. You have made
my study and life in Rochester a wonderful time. My warmest appreciation also goes to Haimanot
Yohannes and Wondwossen Teferi. Thank you for all the support and for making me feel at home.
Finally, I give glory and thanks to God. Glory to our Lady St. Mary. Thank you, Lord, for everything.

iv

Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1
1.1

Background ................................................................................................................................... 1

1.2

Literature review ........................................................................................................................... 2

1.3

Knowledge gap ............................................................................................................................. 3

1.4

Research goals and novel contributions ........................................................................................ 4

Chapter 2: What is the optimal subsidy for residential solar? ............................................................... 6
2.1

Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 6

2.2

Literature Review.......................................................................................................................... 7

2.3

Methods......................................................................................................................................... 8

2.3.1

Adoption Model .................................................................................................................... 9

2.3.2

Technological Progress Model............................................................................................ 12

2.3.3

Benefit-Cost Model ............................................................................................................. 13

2.3.4

Optimizing subsidies to maximize benefits ........................................................................ 16

2.3.5

Direct and indirect benefits ................................................................................................. 18

2.3.6

Carbon abatement cost ........................................................................................................ 19

2.4

Results and Discussions .............................................................................................................. 19

2.4.1

Optimal national flexible subsidy starting in 2018 ............................................................. 19

2.4.2

Retrospective early technology subsidy starting in 2012 .................................................... 21

2.4.3

Direct vs. Indirect benefits .................................................................................................. 22

2.4.4

State-by-state heterogeneity and state-flexible subsidy ...................................................... 23

2.4.5

Carbon Abatement Cost ...................................................................................................... 25

2.4.6

Sensitivity analysis: discount rates ...................................................................................... 26

2.5

Conclusions and Recommendations ........................................................................................... 27

Chapter 3: Roles of diffusion patterns, technological progress and environmental benefits in
determining renewable subsidies ............................................................................................................. 30
3.1

Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 30

3.2

Literature Review........................................................................................................................ 31

3.3

Methods: Model-with-learning ................................................................................................... 33

3.3.1

Adoption model................................................................................................................... 34

3.3.2

Technology progress model ................................................................................................ 40

3.3.3

Benefit-Cost model ............................................................................................................. 40

3.4

Model-with-learning results ........................................................................................................ 41
v

3.5

Methods: Model-without-learning .............................................................................................. 43

3.5.1

Benefit-cost analysis ........................................................................................................... 44

3.5.2

Model-without-learning for optimal subsidy level ............................................................. 45

3.6

Model-without-learning results ................................................................................................... 46

3.7

Discussions: Linking technology attributes to subsidy structure ................................................ 48

3.8

Sensitivity analysis: discount rates ............................................................................................. 49

3.9

Conclusions and Recommendations ........................................................................................... 50

Chapter 4: Informing optimal subsidy for residential solar: the role of technology adoption
modeling uncertainties.............................................................................................................................. 52
4.1

Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 52

4.2

Methods....................................................................................................................................... 55

4.2.1

Techno-economic framework ............................................................................................. 55

4.2.2

Adoption models ................................................................................................................. 55

4.2.3

Model Evaluation ................................................................................................................ 61

4.3

Results and Discussions .............................................................................................................. 63

4.3.1

Adoption Curves ................................................................................................................. 63

4.3.2

Forecasting Residential Solar PV Adoption ....................................................................... 64

4.3.3

Optimal Subsidy.................................................................................................................. 66

4.4

Sensitivity analysis: discount rates ............................................................................................. 68

4.5

Conclusions and Recommendations ........................................................................................... 69

Chapter 5: Conclusions ............................................................................................................................ 71
5.1 Policy Implications ........................................................................................................................... 74
5.2 Limitations ........................................................................................................................................ 75
5.3 Future works ..................................................................................................................................... 76
References ................................................................................................................................................... 77

List of Figures
Figure 1. Summary of integrated model combining adoption, technological progress and benefit-cost
analysis.......................................................................................................................................................... 9
Figure 2. Schedules for optimal national flexible subsidy and planned/historical 30% Federal Tax Credit
(FTC). ......................................................................................................................................................... 20

vi

Figure 3. Optimal national flexible subsidy compared with a perpetual Federal Tax Credit (FTC) of 30%
starting in the year 2012. ............................................................................................................................. 21
Figure 4. Direct and indirect benefits for the optimal national flexible subsidy schedule .......................... 23
Figure 5. State level results for optimal subsidies....................................................................................... 25
Figure 6. Optimal first-year subsidy level for a state-by-state flexible subsidy schedule........................... 25
Figure 7. Sensitivity analysis results showing the net benefit of the optimal national flexible subsidy for
different discount rates. ............................................................................................................................... 27
Figure 8. Geographical scope of optimal subsidy analysis consisting 13 ISO regions. .............................. 34
Figure 9. Adoption model for utility-scale wind generation using the NPV ($/MW) as the explanatory
variable........................................................................................................................................................ 37
Figure 10. Normalized adoption curves for utility wind and residential solar PV...................................... 39
Figure 11. Uniform federal subsidy schedule that optimizes national net benefits. ................................... 42
Figure 12. Subsidy schedules that vary by region that optimize national net benefits ............................... 43
Figure 13. Technology attributes ($/Watt of environmental benefits on x-axis, Watt/$ sensitivity of
diffusion to price on y-axis) in 13 grid regions in the US ........................................................................... 47
Figure 14. First-year optimal subsidy level for model-with-learning and model-without-learning ........... 48
Figure 15. Uniform optimal subsidies for residential solar PV and utility-scale wind for discount rates
ranging between 1% - 6% ........................................................................................................................... 50
Figure 16. Historical data and residual plots for different adoption models. An error function, mixed loglinear regression and logit functions are used to model adoption trends. ................................................... 63
Figure 17. Adoption prediction comparison for the three models as a function of the NPV. ..................... 64
Figure 18. US annual adoption starting from 2012 with planned 30% FTC and learning rate of 15%
predicted by the different adoption models................................................................................................. 65
Figure 19. US annual adoption starting from 2012 with planned 30% FTC subsidy that expires in 2024
and no subsidy at LR of 15%. ..................................................................................................................... 66
Figure 20. Optimal subsidy schedule for sample cases of learning rates and social costs of carbon. ........ 67
Figure 21. First year optimal subsidy determined using the different adoption models for different values
of learning rate (%) and social cost of carbon ($/ton)................................................................................. 68
Figure 22. Optimal subsidy design using different discount rates at a learning rate of 15% and social cost
of carbon of $45/ton. ................................................................................................................................... 69

List of Tables
Table 1. Summary results for different subsidy schedules for residential solar. ........................................ 26
vii

Table 2. Names used to represent the 13 regions on EIA’s “Hourly Electric Grid Monitor” website (EIA,
2021a) and this study. ................................................................................................................................. 34
Table 3. Wind adoption model data sources. .............................................................................................. 38
Table 4. Optimal subsidy model data.......................................................................................................... 41
Table 5. Model with and without learning. ................................................................................................. 45
Table 6. Technology attributes of residential solar and utility wind and optimal subsidies (with and
without technological progress). ................................................................................................................. 49
Table 7. Model names and theoretical framings for three adoption models with three different functional
forms consisting of single and multi-variable explanatory variables.......................................................... 56
Table 8. Data sources for residential solar PV adoption model fittings. ..................................................... 57
Table 9. Descriptive statistics of the variables used for fitting the adoption models. ................................. 57
Table 10. Estimated values of the parameters using least square method. ................................................. 58
Table 11. Parameter coefficient estimates for predicting annual adoption using mixed log-linear
regression. ................................................................................................................................................... 59
Table 12. Parameter coefficient estimates for logit demand models. ......................................................... 61
Table 13. Total squared error of the adoption models fitted using historical county data. ......................... 62
Table 14. Correlation matrix. ...................................................................................................................... 63

viii

Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Background
In the US, 63% of electricity generation in 2018 came from fossil fuel sources such as coal and
natural gas (US EIA, 2020a). The high share of fossil fuel sources in the energy grid mix has led the
power sector to be one of the most emissions-intensive sectors in the country and contributed 27% of total
greenhouse gas emissions in the same year (US EPA, 2018a). Combustion of fossil fuels results in
greenhouse gas emissions that can have both short- and long-term effects on the environment. It can also
have a negative impact on human health as a result of air pollution and air quality reduction.
Various policy tools can be employed to achieve environmental emissions reductions. These
mechanisms can be administrative: laws that restrict or ban the emission of harmful substances, or
informative: labeling environmentally friendly products (Palm and Larsson, 2007). From an economic
point of view, direct pricing of emissions (tax and tradable permits) is the most efficient instrument to
reduce environmental emissions. But policymakers do not usually implement such mechanisms as they
can have a considerable economic restraint on the firmly established sectors (Fischer and Newell, 2005).
As a result, subsidies to emerging clean technologies are regarded as the second-best option to overcome
the challenges of environmental emissions (Metcalf, 2007).
Renewable energy sources are considered the primary option to reduce fossil fuel consumption and
address the consequences of emissions from conventional power plants. Clean energy technologies
mainly use renewable sources such as solar and wind to generate electricity and have zero operational
emissions. Both federal and state governments have employed different incentives to promote the
adoption of such technologies. The two main types of incentive programs the federal government offers
are investment and production tax credits for renewable energy projects. In addition, various forms of
grants and loan programs are also enacted by the federal government (US EIA, 2018). State governments
have also adopted several strategies to increase the share of renewable energy generation in their
electricity system. 29 states and Washington, DC, have implemented renewable portfolio standards (RPS)
policies to achieve a targeted percentage of renewable electricity sales (Barbose, 2019). New York state's
2015 clean energy standard sets a goal to meet 50% of the load using electricity generated from
renewable resources by 2030 (N.C. Clean Energy Technology Center, 2020). California and
Massachusetts also expect to meet 60% and 40% of their electricity demand from clean energy within a
similar time frame (Barbose, 2019). RPS goals are promoted through a renewable purchase requirement
imposed on utilities and load serving entities. The load serving entities mainly meet this requirement by
operating their own renewable energy facility or purchasing renewable energy credits (RECs) from
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private facilities that generate electricity from eligible resources (Wiser et al., 1998). State governments
have also implemented a net metering policy that allows grid connected customers to receive credits for
excess renewable energy electricity generated and fed into the grid (Stokes and Breetz, 2018).
Over the years, renewable energy capacity has grown in the US energy mix. The total renewable
energy nameplate capacity (excluding hydropower) in the US reached about 160 GW in 2019, up from 16
GW in 2000. The electricity generated from renewables (excluding hydropower) has also increased from
a share of 2.1% in 2000 to 10.7% in 2019. Several factors drive this increased adoption of renewables in
the US, to name a few: technology cost decline, emissions regulations, and incentive policies. The
evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of various policies in driving RE adoption and electricity
generation has been a focus point of many empirical studies. Tax incentives, rebates, and grants are found
to be effective in promoting renewable energy capacity (Hitaj, 2013; Kilinc-Ata, 2016; Sarzynski et al.,
2012). RPS policy implementation is also effective in stimulating RE investment and deployment but did
not significantly increase the share of RE generation (Carley, 2009).
Both federal and state governments have spent substantial financial investments to implement
renewable energy policies. The 2009 American Recovery Act allocated more than $25 billion for
supporting renewable power generation (Aldy, 2013). Federal government spending on subsidies related
to renewables was about $6.7 billion in 2016, 93% of which was through tax-related support and direct
expenditure (US EIA, 2018). State government’s renewable energy funding noticeably emerged in the
late 1990s with as high as a $135 million annual funding program in California for a duration of 13 years
(Bolinger et al., 2001). CA also has a statewide budget of $3.3 billion to promote solar power in the state
(CPUC, 2020). As a result of such large public spending, it is crucial to evaluate the efficiency of
government policies from environmental, economic, and technological perspectives.
1.2 Literature review
There is a significant body of literature that estimates the near-term environmental effects of clean
energy subsidies. Prior work on the direct costs and benefits of subsidies is detailed and covers a variety
of technologies. Michalek et al. (2011) use life-cycle assessment and environmental risk modeling to
compare emissions damage reduction from the adoption of EVs with the environmental externalities and
oil cost of conventional vehicles in the US. Their work shows that the direct social benefits of owning and
operating EVs with large battery packs are far less than the cost of EV subsidies. Sexton et al. (2018)
investigate the effectiveness of state and federal subsidies for rooftop solar and calculate direct pollution
avoidance benefits, showing that subsidy levels and resulting environmental benefits are uncorrelated.
The authors identify states with generous subsidies that exceed avoided environmental damages and other
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states with subsidies lower than environmental benefits. Hughes and Podolefsky (2015) estimate the
economic cost of rebate programs for residential solar photovoltaic installations in California and
compare that with monetized benefits from reduced electricity generation and CO2 emissions savings.
They find that the benefits are moderate compared to other efficiency programs, such as utility-based
demand-side management (Gillingham et al. 2006). Frondel et al. (2010) examine the renewable energy
policy in Germany by comparing the cost of government investment in renewable energy promotion with
its benefits in terms of climate impact, job creation, and technological innovation. They conclude that the
cost of government support is higher than the benefits.
While these studies provide a detailed examination of the environmental benefits directly resulting
from adoption, they do not incorporate the potential impact of subsidy policy on technological learning
and consequent long-term effects on adoption. Prior literature on optimal subsidy has considered the
learning effect for several different policy objectives, such as attaining an increased share of clean energy
generation ( Kim and Lee, 2012; Dong, 2014), achieving a target adoption rate (Hsu, 2012; Jeon et al.,
2015; Lobel and Perakis, 2011), or improving performance through R&D investment (Shrimali and
Baker, 2012). From a social welfare perspective, van Benthem et al. (2008) developed a model to assess
the economic efficiency of subsidies that correct environmental externalities and induce learning-bydoing. The model is applied to evaluate the residential PV subsidy in California, which shows that, in the
case of the California Solar Initiative (CSI) program, the subsidy is economically justified only if
spillover benefits from learning is taken into account. Wand and Leuthold (2011) take a similar approach
to evaluate the social net benefit of feed-in tariffs for residential solar PV installations in Germany. They
show that an optimal solar PV feed-in tariff varies under different scenarios of solar cell technology and
economic growth.
1.3 Knowledge gap
Given the body of literature discussed above, there are critical knowledge gaps to fill when
investigating the design of efficient policies that support clean energy technologies. The first area is
practical application: there is a lack of work connecting system modeling to practical decisions faced by
policymakers. What is the appropriate extent and duration of a subsidy? Van Bentham et al. (2008)
conclude that California policymakers made the “right” choice from 2006-2016. Lobel and Parekis (2011)
argue that Germany should have larger upfront subsidies that declined more quickly. Jeon et al. (2015)
develop a systems dynamics model and find separate allocations for research and development versus
adoption subsidies. These are informative results, but clearly more work is needed to corroborate as well
as assess other decision attributes important to policymakers. In addition to this, an important question
relates to the appropriate geographic unit over which to implement a subsidy: should the solar subsidy in
3

California and Maine be identical? Currently, in the US, the federal subsidy for solar is equivalent
nationwide, though individual states often supplement this with their own programs. However, the
financial benefits of solar panels vary widely by location, i.e. NPV of adoption is higher in states with
higher solar insolation and electricity prices. The public benefits of solar panels, specifically emissions
reductions in carbon and other pollutants, depend on the electricity system in which they reside, which
also varies by state. It is thus important to consider how heterogeneity between areas affects the
appropriate geographic unit and values for subsidies. A second priority is to examine the arguments and
justifications for subsidizing different clean energy technologies. E.g., how do residential solar subsidies
compare with utility solar or wind? One approach is to identify how technological characteristics such as
diffusion patterns, technological progress, and environmental benefits affect and drive the subsidies for
these technologies. The third point is considering the impact of model and parameter uncertainties on
policy design. Most prior authors recognized that subsidy outcomes are sensitive to uncertain parameter
values such as learning rates, future electricity prices, and externality costs. While uncertainty in
forecasting complex energy systems will not be resolved anytime soon, it is important to progressively
improve modeling of each component and better characterize how qualitative outcomes depend on both
model structure and parameter selection assumptions.
1.4 Research goals and novel contributions
Governments justify implementing renewable energy subsidies on the grounds of public-good
argument through environmental benefits and technology development. But it is not clear how both
federal and state governments set and decide on the levels and durations of these policies. This
dissertation addresses this matter by developing a comprehensive assessment and modeling approach to
design optimal policies from society’s perspective. The main goal of this study is to inform policymakers
by providing quantitative analysis and analytical tools accounting for different factors that play a role in
designing efficient policies. These include consumer demand growth rate, technology attributes, and
geographic heterogeneity.
This research develops an integrated framework to analyze clean energy technology subsidies. The
model can easily be adapted to evaluate other forms of policies and can flexibly be applied to different
types of emerging technologies at the desired geographic aggregations and timeframes. In addition, the
topics covered using the framework are directly related to the field of sustainability. From society’s
perspective, it studies how governments can promote clean energy technologies by directly targeting enduse consumers and delivering social benefits. From an environmental standpoint, the research constitutes
an analysis of emissions reduction potential of government policies. It uses geographically resolved
dispatch level metrics to evaluate emission reductions and damages avoided from greenhouse gases (CO2)
4

and criteria pollutants (NOx, SO2, and PM). Economic-wise, benefit-cost analysis is performed to design
optimal policies that maximize net benefits. The contribution of this dissertation lies in the comprehensive
analysis of government policies integrating these three components, accounting for the cross-over
interaction with technological progress, and evaluation under different technology diffusion modeling
alternatives.
The main research question of this dissertation is:
How can government policies be informed for socially optimal benefits by combining
environmental and technological benefits and accounting for techno-economic characteristics
and uncertainties in different model components?
This study explores the design of a socially optimal government subsidy schedule for renewable
energy technologies and covers the following three specific research areas.
Research Question 1: What is the optimal subsidy for residential solar?
In Chapter 2, this research develops an integrated framework that comprehensively accounts for
current and future expected benefits and costs of clean energy technology policies. The study
implements improved adoption and emissions valuation models by accounting for state and
consumer heterogeneity.
Research Question 2: What are the roles of diffusion patterns, technological progress, and
environmental benefits in determining renewable subsidies?
Chapter 3 uses the integrated framework to quantify the effect of adoption, technology cost
reductions, and environmental benefits on optimal subsidy plans. The study presents a case study
of optimal subsidy design for residential solar PV and utility-scale wind.
Research Question 3: What are the effects of technology diffusion model uncertainties on optimal
subsidy design?
In Chapter 4, we consider three different adoption models with three different combinations of
explanatory variables. The study uses an inter-model comparison to analyze the effect of varying
modeling alternatives on optimal subsidies for residential solar PV.
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Chapter 2: What is the optimal subsidy for residential solar?
2.1 Introduction
In 2019, CO2 emissions from the electric power sector was about 1,600 million metric tons (US EIA,
2020b), of which, 38% was from the residential sector. This makes the residential sector to be the highest
electricity related end-use CO2 emissions generator (US EIA, 2020c). To address such environmental
emissions, federal and state governments have implemented various policies to support clean energy
technologies. These policies target both supply-side and demand-side deployments using subsidies,
emissions taxes, performance standards, cap and trade, technology quotas, or outright banning of
undesirable technologies or materials (Goulder and Parry, 2008). Among these different policy
instruments, this work focuses on subsidies, which are regarded as an important policy approach to
driving adoption of clean energy technologies, especially those that are less mature (Carley, 2009; KilincAta, 2016; Polzin et al., 2015). A subsidy is an attractive policy instrument because it provides a direct
financial incentive which lowers the cost of adopting the technology (Abolhosseini and Heshmati, 2014)
and is generally preferred by technology investors over other policy tools (Bürer and Wüstenhagen, 2009;
Kasemir et al., 2000).
Two main conceptual arguments are used to justify clean energy subsidies. The first is that the
subsidy directly drives consumer adoption of clean energy technologies, reducing the use of fossil fuels
and yielding environmental benefits in the form of reduced emissions. The second justification for energy
technology subsidies argues that the government can play an important role in stimulating market
development and continued improvements of socially desirable technologies. By changing the relative
price of adopting clean energy technologies, the subsidy can create a market for these technologies, drive
post-adoption innovation (Nemet, 2009), and enable learning by doing (Arrow, 1962). The induced
technological learning may lead to a substantial amount of cost-reduction or performance-enhancing
improvement in existing technologies, thereby activating broader adoption.
The two conceptual arguments for economic justification of renewable policies are incomplete on
their own: the first (direct environmental benefit) neglects an explicit role for government in supporting
promising emerging technologies and innovations, while the latter (indirect innovation benefit) ignores
the fact that some technologies may take too long to be competitive or have too little environmental
benefit to justify current production subsidies. Considering only one of the two justifications can result in
underestimation of the total benefit of the subsidy.
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2.2 Literature Review
To date, only a handful of studies have attempted to estimate the optimal government subsidy of
residential solar, considering different types of subsidies, e.g., a one-time investment subsidy offered at
the time of initial installation vs. an operational subsidy like Feed-in-Tariff (FIT) that pays above-market
prices for solar-generated power. Van Bentham et al. (2008) provide the first benefit-cost analysis of solar
investment subsidies accounting for the interaction of technological progress and diffusion. The authors
study residential solar subsidies in California using an experience curve to describe cost reductions,
developing a simple adoption model that depends on Net Present Value (NPV) and monetizing benefits
from carbon and criteria pollutant emission reductions. Their results indicate that the existing California
Solar Initiative (CSI) program was similar to the optimal subsidy in maximizing public benefits. Wand
and Leuthold (2011) study the FIT policy in Germany using a similar model, finding that public benefits
of optimal subsidy varied by design and extent depending on scenarios for driving variables such as
electricity prices, cost of environmental externality, and PV market growth rates. Lobel and Parekis
(2011) also analyze solar FIT schedules in Germany, finding that optimal schedules started with higher
subsidy and declined faster than the implemented national subsidy. Studies after these varied in aspects of
model and geography. Alternate optimization objectives were considered, maximizing adoption with
fixed budget (Dong, 2014; Jeon et al., 2015) and minimizing subsidy expenditures to achieve different
goals.
This chapter follows on the above literature to design optimal subsidy schedule for residential solar
PV in the US. The study conducts the analysis at the state level and estimates state-specific adoption of
solar panels, and environmental benefits using the marginal emissions factors that account for
heterogeneity in electricity systems. We aggregate the state-specific benefits at the national level and
estimate a uniform federal optimal subsidy that maximizes total nation-wide net social benefits. We also
examine the distribution of these benefits across states under a homogeneous national-level subsidy
schedule. We further estimate a state-by-state optimal subsidy schedule that yields greater national
benefits. The model accounts for observed adoption patterns of homeowners, technological progress via
an experience curve, and a sophisticated locationally-resolved evaluation of emissions reductions.
This work contributes to methods and applications of modeling optimal subsidies. For
methodological contribution, we draw on developments in modeling of solar diffusion, electricity system
emissions, and valuation of pollution damages to develop an improved model linking adoption,
technological progress, and subsidy design. First, for diffusion, we use the model recently developed by
(Williams et al., 2020) that explains PV diffusion as a function of NPV as experienced by consumers.
While qualitatively similar to the diffusion modeling in Van Bentham et al. (2008) and Wand and
7

Leuthold (2011), the model has a different functional form and definition of variables and has been shown
to be empirically robust with same parameter values in five different regions (California, Massachusetts,
Arizona, Germany and Japan) (Williams et al., 2020). Second, there is increasing recognition that
emissions reductions due to a demand shift, such as from solar panels, are better described via marginal as
opposed to average emissions (Siler-Evans et al., 2013). The core issue is that average emission factors
assume that the operation of all power plants changes when a demand change is introduced to the grid,
while marginal emissions account for observed changes in generation mix, generally for the power plant
at the margin (Hawkes, 2014). Third, there has been an evolution in risk assessment valuations of criteria
air pollutants such as SO2, NOX, and particulate matter (PM). Improved knowledge and modeling of
chemical transformations of pollutants enables more accurate estimates of concentrations (Azevedo et al.,
2019). Also, recognition of locational variations in pollutant damages has led to more geographically
resolved models of social costs (ibid), which we integrate into this work. In the application of optimal
subsidy modeling to policy, our primary goal is to explore the effect of different geographical
aggregations on benefits and costs, in particular to compare a nationwide subsidy versus one that varies
state-by-state in the US.
2.3 Methods
This study conducts a benefit-cost model of residential solar in the US, with a time horizon of 20182047. We conduct the analysis at the state level and estimate state-specific adoption of solar panels, and
environmental benefits using the marginal emissions factors that account for heterogeneity in electricity
systems. We aggregate the state-specific benefits at the national level and estimate a uniform federal
optimal subsidy that maximizes total nation-wide net social benefits. We also examine the distribution of
these benefits across states under a homogeneous national-level subsidy schedule. We further estimate a
state-by-state optimal subsidy schedule that yields greater national benefits. The model accounts for
observed adoption patterns of homeowners, technological progress via an experience curve, and a
sophisticated locationally-resolved evaluation of emissions reductions.
The integrated model developed in this research constitutes three modules: adoption, technology
progress, and benefit-cost analysis (Figure 1). The model is applied to assess the interaction between
subsidy, adoption, technological progress, and social benefits over time. Specifically, we expect that
adding a subsidy leads to increased immediate solar PV adoption, which then drives technological
learning and cost reductions of the technology. The technological progress resulting from initial “induced
adoption” will in turn increase PV adoption in the following years. We estimate the benefits as monetized
emissions reductions from total induced technology adoption, which includes those directly stimulated by
the subsidy and the follow-on adoption driven by the technology price reductions. From the government’s
8

perspective, we calculate the net benefit nationwide as the total emission reduction benefits minus the
government’s expenditure on subsidies, both discounted to present value. Using this analytical
framework, we compare and evaluate the effects of different subsidy schedules relative to results under a
“no-subsidy” case, where adoption and technology progress still occur but are not stimulated by
government subsidy.

Figure 1. Summary of integrated model combining adoption, technological progress and benefit-cost
analysis. A simple optimization routine is applied to this model to identify the subsidy schedule that
maximizes discounted net benefits.
The three models that constitute the integrated framework are discussed below.
2.3.1

Adoption Model
Various models have been developed to predict the adoption rate or purchase decision of a

consumer as a function of time, economic cost and benefit, demographics, and environmental attitudes.
These include Bass diffusion modeling (Guidolin and Mortarino, 2010), discrete choice models (Islam,
2014), and agent-based models (Macal et al., 2014; Noll et al., 2014; Rai et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2016).
For this study, with the goal of integrating the adoption model into a larger framework, we use a
parsimonious model with minimal regressors that are reducible to plausible assumptions about
fundamental system interactions. This adoption module uses a technology diffusion model developed in
Williams et al., (2020). The model is constructed for residential solar PV diffusion and uses regression
parameters whose values have straightforward interpretations in terms of the system’s dynamics. It starts
with one explanatory variable, Net Present Value (NPV) as experienced by residents in a particular
region, to explain the rate of adoption. The NPV of a residential PV system can be written as:
9

𝑁

𝑗
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑘

$
𝐸𝑘 ∗ 𝑃𝑘
1
(
) = (−𝐼 𝑗 + 𝑆𝑗 ) + ∑
(1 + 𝑖𝑛𝑡)𝑖 𝐶𝐴𝑃
𝑘𝑊

(1)

𝑖=1

where j is a year in a US state k. 𝐼𝑗 is the investment cost ($/kW) of the PV system, 𝑆𝑗 is the subsidy
investment ($/kW), e.g. a 30% federal tax rebate in the US. The subsidy, 𝑆𝑗 we consider in this study is a
capital subsidy that offsets the initial upfront cost of PV installation. The choice of this type of subsidy is
based on the current/historical US federal government investment tax credit support for roof-top solar.
There are other subsidy mechanisms, such as Feed-in-Tariffs (FIT), used e.g. in Germany and Japan.
Empirical evidence from the diffusion model (Williams et al 2020) suggests that to a first approximation,
effects of adoption by government support can be modeled by its effect on Net Present Value and is not
tied to any specific form. 𝐸𝑘 (in kWh) is the annual electricity production based on solar resources and 𝑃𝑘
($/kWh) is the average price of selling electricity to the grid in state k. 𝑃𝑘 corresponds to the retail
electricity price in each state. The formula assumes net metering, pervasive in the US, in which residential
PV systems earn the retail price for all electricity generated. CAP is the nominal capacity of the PV
system, taken as 5 kW (US EIA, 2017a), 𝑖𝑛𝑡 is the real discount rate with default value of 3% and N is the
expected lifetime of a solar PV system which is considered to be 20 years. All monetary values are
adjusted in real 2018 dollars.
Based on the approach in Williams et al. (2020), we assume that the annual residential solar
installation, normalized to the number of detached homes without PV, follows a normal distribution as a
function of NPV. For a given NPV, the number of consumers who will purchase is the integral of a
normal distribution (Equation 2).
𝑁𝑃𝑉
𝑥−𝜇 2
𝑀𝑊
𝑁𝑃𝑉 − 𝜇
𝑗
)
𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘 (
) (𝑁𝑃𝑉) = 𝛼 ∫
𝑑𝑥 𝑒 −( 𝜎
= 𝐾 (1 + erf (
))
𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝜎
−∞

(2)

where erf(x) is the error function, 𝜇 is the peak customer acquisition value and 𝜎 is the spread in this
value. The values of 𝜇 and 𝜎, determined in the original model empirically from observed price/adoption
data, are 7,100 $/kW and 4,110 $/kW, respectively. 𝐾 is a constant fixed at 2,000 kW/million free
households. Williams et al. (2020) test the model using 47 data points for annual adoption and NPV in
five regions (three US states: Arizona, California, and Massachusetts and two countries: Germany and
Japan) from 2005-2016. The model fit to data is surprisingly tight considering its simplicity: The RootMean-Square-Error in adoption rate is 17 MW/million households and the average value of adoption rate
in the dataset is 41 MW/million households.
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We use the adoption model outlined above along with data on state-level total cumulative PV
adoption and number of households with solar PV installations in 2017 to project annual adoptions
starting from 2018 given a certain federal subsidy. The data are collected from the US Energy
Information Administration (EIA) (US EIA, 2017b). We also use the average electricity price in state k,
𝑃𝑘 obtained from EIA’s electric power monthly report (US EIA, 2018) and annual electricity production,
𝐸𝑘 using the PVWatts® model from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). We use the
total number of households that have already installed PV at the initial year of the analysis and total
number of detached houses in a given state, obtained from the US Census Bureau (2011), to determine the
total number of potential free households installing PV in the next year. A state’s annual adoption is
determined by multiplying the results of Equation 5 with the estimated number of potential free
households. The model then estimates the total number of households installing PV annually by taking
the ratio of annual adoption and the average household PV system size, which in turn is used to determine
the remaining number of detached households that are yet to install PV. The results of annual state-level
adoption are summed up to determine national level annual adoption which in turn is used to estimate
national cumulative adoption (𝑃𝑗 ). Cumulative adoption is used as an input for the technology model to
determine the cost of installing PV technology. The following variables are used to estimate the statelevel annual adoption (MW).
𝑗

ℎℎ 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑉𝑘 (𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠) – is the number of detached households with PV
𝑗
ℎℎ 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑃𝑉𝑘 (𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠) – is the number of free detached households without PV

𝑗
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘 (𝑀𝑊) = 𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑘 (

𝑀𝑊
𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠

𝑗−1

) (𝑁𝑃𝑉) ∗ ℎℎ 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑃𝑉𝑘

, 1 < 𝑗 < 30

(3)

The analysis uses data for 2017 as the base or initial year (𝑗 = 0) and estimates the adoption starting from
2018 (𝑗 = 1) to 2047 (𝑗 = 30).
For 𝑗 > 0, the model estimates the number of households installing PV annually by dividing the annual
adoption (Equation 3) with the PV system size of 5 kW (5000W). This in turn is used to determine the
remaining number of detached households that are yet to install PV.
𝑗

𝑗
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘 (𝑀𝑊)
ℎℎ 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑉𝑘
=
,
5000 𝑊
(𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠)
𝑗

ℎℎ 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑃𝑉𝑘
=
(𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠)

𝑗−1

𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 1 < 𝑗 < 30

(4)

𝑗

ℎℎ 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑃𝑉𝑘
ℎℎ 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑉𝑘
−
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 1 < 𝑗 < 30
(𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠)
(𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠)

(5)
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2.3.2

Technological Progress Model

The technological progress model is based on a modification of the one-factor experience curve.
Developed first to describe cost reductions in aircraft manufacturing (Wright, 1936), the experience curve
is an empirically observed power law decay of some characteristic of industrial processes and cumulative
experience implementing that process (Teplitz and Carlson, 1991; Yelle, 1979). In the energy domain, the
experience curve takes the form:
$

𝑃𝑗−1
)
𝑃0

𝐶𝑗 (𝑊) = 𝐶 0 (

−𝛼

(6)

where 𝑃𝑗 is a measure of cumulative adoption of a technology (e.g., the total watt capacity of solar cells
produced), 𝐶𝑗 is the technology price per energy unit (e.g., $/Wp or $/kWh), 𝐶 0 and 𝑃0 are initial cost and
production values, and α is a (positive) empirical constant, known as the learning coefficient. α is related
to the fractional reduction in costs for every doubling of production, known as the Learning Rate, given
by the equation LR = 1-2-α. Despite its simplicity, the above equation fits empirical data quite well. Nagy
et al. (2013) showed that R-squared exceeds 90% for a majority of 62 technologies. While there are more
complex models that separate learning into separate factors such as learning-by-doing, learning-byresearch, materials and other factors (Nemet, 2006; Pillai, 2015), understanding such distinctions is not
the purpose here, so the empirically robust single factor curve above is used.
The technological progress model uses time series data from Solar Energy Industries Association
(SEIA) and International Energy Agency (IEA) reports on production and cost of residential PV in the
US. Using these data, we estimated a technology learning rate (LR) of 15% (IEA, 2017; SEIA, 2017).
Initial cost, 𝐶 0 , and cumulative production, 𝑃0 , are taken as 3.84 $/W (real $2018) and 10,318 MW,
representing the state of US residential solar at the end of 2017. Technology price projections are made
starting from 2018 using Equation 6.
The technological progress model assumes learning and technological cost reductions at the
national scale and uses the estimate of the national cumulative adoption. The state-level annual adoption
are aggregated to determine the national annual adoption.
51
𝑗
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑀𝑊) = ∑ 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘 (𝑀𝑊)
𝑗

(7)

𝑘=1

The national cumulative adoption of the technology in a year 𝑗 is given by Equation (8).
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𝑗

𝑃𝑗 = 𝑃0 + ∑ 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 (𝑀𝑊) ,

𝑗>0

(8)

𝑖=1

The adoption and the technological progress models are interdependent and are run iteratively: set
a subsidy level, calculate expected adoption in the first period, use that adoption to estimate technological
progress and resulting price in the second period, which dictates adoption in the second period, etc.
We tested state-level experience curves that separated module and balance-of-system costs but
found that there was insufficient data to support that approach. Thus, the technology progress model has
US residential PV adoption following a single national experience curve. Note that PV adoption at
commercial and utility scales as well as elsewhere in the world has spillover effects affecting US
residential solar prices. We assume that US residential adoption more or less tracks global adoption in all
markets and have verified that this assumption is reasonable in historical behavior of solar markets. We
consider our assumption to be a reasonable approximation after looking at the historical data on both US
residential and global PV adoption. The global solar installation trend over time is compared with the US
residential adoption using different starting years. If the initial year is set to be 2004, the US is adopting
residential PV much faster than the rest of the world implying that the US observes a smaller effect of
learning rate as the global installation is not contributing enough to the cost reduction. On the other hand,
for the most recent years like 2010, the two growth rates roughly come closer to each other. The spillover
effect from the global PV adoption as well as US commercial and utility scale PV installation is observed
to progressively reduce over the years. We find the later trend to be more relevant for a model projecting
future adoption rates, hence, a single learning rate is employed.
2.3.3

Benefit-Cost Model
The emissions model is based on the established literature regarding the current and expected

future environmental benefits of emerging clean energy technologies. This includes several studies
looking at the environmental benefits from the adoption of wind, solar, and electric vehicles (Cullen,
2013; Nugent and Sovacool, 2014; Siler-Evans et al., 2013; Sioshansi and Denholm, 2009). This body of
literature uses different approaches depending on the technology studied but tends to follow a common
process: study the effect of adoption on electricity system dispatch, estimate resulting upstream and
downstream emissions changes, and run a physical environmental risk analysis (fate/transport, exposure,
and dose/response).
Assessment of emissions reductions is determined using marginal emissions factors linked to
estimated damages from specific power plants. Marginal emission factors (MEFs) are quantities that
13

reflect the emission intensity of those conventional power generators that are displaced in response to a
given intervention (Siler-Evans et al., 2012). MEFs are reliable measurements (Siler-Evans et al., 2013)
used when assessing the avoided emissions attributed to the displaced conventional electric power
generator as a result of the adoption of clean energy technology. This research employs MEFs generated
by Azevedo et al., (2019). Their model is based on regression analysis of hourly generation and emission
data to estimate regional MEFs for CO2, NOx, SO2 and PM2.5 for the US electricity system. The emission
model further estimates the avoided damage from reductions of CO2, NOx, SO2 and PM2.5 emissions
based on existing literature and models (Heo and Adams, 2015) that estimate social costs and marginal
damage factors (MDFs) of emissions (Azevedo et al., 2019).
The data for the marginal emission and damage factors are disaggregated into 22 eGRID regions.
Since our analysis is done at the state level, the particular eGRID region a state belongs to is determined
using the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Power Profiler tool (US EPA, 2018b). The eGRID
region that covers the highest number of zip code areas in a given state is taken as the representative
region for that state. Averages of the hourly marginal emissions data between 9 am – 3 pm for the year
2016 are used to estimate the total emissions avoided in each state. The 2016 average marginal damage
data is used in our base case analysis for pollutants and a social cost of $45/ton (ton = metric ton) is used
for determining CO2 emissions damage. Though marginal emissions factors have been more consistent
than average emissions factors as the grid composition have shifted, cleaner future grids may have lower
MEFs than today.
The Benefit-Cost model starts with estimating the discounted environmental benefit of a 1MW
solar PV system over a lifetime of N = 20 years (𝐸𝐵20). This is performed for each state using statespecific capacity factors. The energy generation from 1MW of solar PV system is given by:
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘 (𝑀𝑊ℎ) = 1𝑀𝑊 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑘 ∗ 8760 ℎ

(9)

where 𝐶𝐹𝑘 – is the capacity factor in state k. We assume that the annual energy generated from the solar
PV degrade at 0.5%/year. We used 0.5% after looking at the degradation rate of five current PV modules
available in the US market whose production is expected to increase in the coming years (Feldmand and
Margolis, 2018). Hence,
𝑗

𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑘 (𝑀𝑊ℎ) = 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘 ∗ (1 − 𝑅𝑑 )𝑗−1

(10)

where 𝑅𝑑 – is the degradation rate. Marginal emissions and damage factors are employed to estimate the
amount of emissions and damages that can be avoided as a result of the estimated annual generation. The
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damage that can be avoided from CO2 emissions reductions is estimated using CO2 marginal emissions
factors (MEF) and a social cost of carbon of $45/ton (Equation 11 and Equation 12).
𝑗

𝑗

𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑂2 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑘 (𝑡𝑜𝑛) = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑘 (𝑀𝑊ℎ) ∗ 𝑀𝐸𝐹𝐶𝑂2 ,𝑘 (
𝑗

𝑗

𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑂2 𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑘 ($) = 𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑂2 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑘 (𝑡𝑜𝑛) ∗ 45 (

𝑡𝑜𝑛
)
𝑀𝑊ℎ

$
)
𝑡𝑜𝑛

(11)

(12)

For criteria pollutants (NOx, SO2 and PM), we used the respective marginal damage factors (MDF) to
estimate the resulting avoided damage (Equation 13).
𝑗
𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑘 ($)
𝑗

= 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘 (𝑀𝑊ℎ) ∗ (𝑀𝐷𝐹𝑁𝑂𝑥 ,𝑘 + 𝑀𝐷𝐹𝑆𝑂2 ,𝑘 + 𝑀𝐷𝐹𝑃𝑀,𝑘 ) (

$
)
𝑀𝑊ℎ

(13)

Equation 12 and 13 are summed up to estimate the annual damage that can be avoided from 1MW of
solar PV installation accounting for both CO2 and criteria pollutants emissions reduction.
𝑗

𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑘 (

$
𝑗
) = 𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑂2 𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑘 + 𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗𝑘 (14)
𝑀𝑊

By using Equation 14, we estimate the discounted benefit from 1MW solar PV system over a lifetime of
N = 20 years as:
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𝑗

$
𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑘
𝐸𝑛𝑣. 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑘 (
)= ∑
𝑀𝑊
(1 + 𝐷𝑅)𝑗

(15)

𝑗=1

where DR – is the discount rate. Based on the discounted 20-year benefit of a 1 MW solar PV, we can
𝑗

estimate the discounted benefit resulting from any given annual adoption. For 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘 (𝑀𝑊)
in a given year j and state k, the annual discounted benefit is given by:

𝑗

𝑗

𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑘 ($) = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘 (𝑀𝑊) ∗

𝐸𝑛𝑣. 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑘 (
(1 + 𝐷𝑅)𝑗

$
)
𝑀𝑊

(16)

We considered the benefit from residential solar PV installations to last over 30 years (1 < 𝑗 < 30),
hence, the cumulative discounted benefit is estimated by aggregating the annual values estimated in
Equation 16.
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30
𝑗

𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 30𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑘 ($) = ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑘 ($)

(17)

𝑗=1

The model estimates the benefit resulting from a given subsidy schedule relative to the discounted benefit
of a no-subsidy counterfactual case where 𝑆𝑗 = 0.
𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑘 ($) = (

𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 30𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 30𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑘
)−(
)
𝑗
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 (𝑆 )
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 (𝑆𝑗 = 0)

(18)

The discounted annual government cost as a result of subsidy, 𝑆𝑗 in year j is given by:
𝑗

𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙

𝑗
𝐺𝑜𝑣. 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑘

𝑆𝑗 ∗ 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘
($) =
(1 + 𝐷𝑅)𝑗

(19)

Hence, the cumulative government cost is estimated by:
30
𝑗

𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑘 ($) = ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑜𝑣. 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑘

(20)

𝑗=1

The net benefit in a given state k is:
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑘 ($) = 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑘 ($) − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑘 ($)

(21)

The national net benefit is the sum of the state-level net benefits for each of 50 states plus Washington,
DC.
51

𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 ($) = ∑ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑘 ($)

(22)

𝑘=1

Similarly, the total government cost at the national level is given by:
51

𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 ($) = ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑘 ($)

(23)

𝑘=1

2.3.4

Optimizing subsidies to maximize benefits
The subsidy considered is an initial capital cost subsidy ($/kW), with the same amount paid to

any consumer in an area. The adoption model from 2.3.1 aggregates all consumers in a region, i.e. it does
not distinguish between different incomes or demographic characteristics. Early adopters are expected to
mainly be high- and medium-income households – income-differentiated subsidies to encourage adoption
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by lower income households are not treated here. We allow subsidies to have a variable schedule and use
cost-benefit analysis to find the unique schedule that results in the highest net benefits.
National Flexible Subsidy: In this case the capital subsidy is constant over the US (like the Federal Tax
Credit and flexible in the sense that it can freely vary in value each year. The decision variables for
optimization are values of the subsidy in each year, 𝑆𝑗 ( 𝑗 = 1 … 30). The optimization model is
formulated as:
Decision variables:
𝑆𝑗 (

$
),
𝑘𝑊

𝑓𝑜𝑟 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 30

Objective function:
51

max (𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡) = max (∑ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑘 )

(24)

𝑘=1

State-by-state Flexible Subsidy: In this case the capital subsidy can vary by year and by state. The
𝑗

subsidy decision variable is a 51x30 matrix, 𝑆𝑘 , where the index 𝑘 indicates state and 𝑗 the year of the
subsidy.
Decision variables:
𝑗

𝑆𝑘 (

$
),
𝑘𝑊

𝑓𝑜𝑟

1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 30
1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 51

In this case, the set of 51 different subsidy schedules (including Washington, DC) are jointly optimized to
maximize the national net benefit same as 𝐸𝑞. (24):
We implement the optimization model with Excel Solver and using a nonlinear Generalized
Reduced Gradient (GRG) algorithm. For nonlinear optimization, Baker (2015) discusses that the solutions
from Solver are local optimum and that there is no guarantee for the results to be global optimum
solutions. But having additional information on the characteristics of objective function (the net benefit in
this case) may help to understand the solution better. While assessing the functionality of the integrated
framework and estimating the net benefit resulting from different fixed and declining subsidy schedules,
it is observed that the graph of the objective function against the decision variables has a similar shape to
a concave function. This may suggest that the local maximum identified can be considered as the best
solution. This optimization method has also a Multistart option for global optimization, which applies
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Continuous Branch and Bound methods. In this case, the optimization automatically chooses different
starting points for the decision variable selecting the best solution from different locally optimal solutions.
We did the analysis both with and without this option and the two converge to the same answer. The
optimal state-by-state flexible subsidy that is different across US states is implemented using Microsoft
Excel OpenSolver Add-in. We used a nonlinear solver model known as COIN-OR Bonmin. This tool
finds globally optimal solutions to convex nonlinear problems in continuous and discrete variables and
may be applied heuristically to nonconvex problems. We ran the optimization model using different
initial values and have obtained the same result each time.
2.3.5

Direct and indirect benefits

We define total benefits from a subsidy as the difference between the discounted 30-year benefit from
reduced CO2 and criteria pollutant emissions with subsidy and the discounted 30-year benefit from
reduced CO2 and criteria pollutant emissions with no subsidy. The benefit can be conceptually divided
into two components: direct benefit and indirect benefit. Direct benefits are those that come from the
additional solar panels that are adopted because of a policy, while indirect benefits are the effects that this
policy has on future adoption through technological progress. These are reasonably distinct conceptually,
but difficult to precisely separate mathematically. The approach we used tries to break down the two
components by employing a simple adjustment to the integrated framework. When estimating the direct
benefit, we assumed that the subsidy has no effect on the technology price reduction. Instead of running
the adoption and technological progress models iteratively, an exogenous technological price that would
follow the same trajectory as the counterfactual “no subsidy” case is used. The direct benefit is the
discounted emissions reduction benefits resulting from subsidy induced adoption while disregarding the
effect of the subsidy on technology progress. The indirect benefit is associated with the additional PV
adoption driven by the subsidy-induced technological progress in the form of cost reductions (technology
progress benefits through learning and innovation that is attributed to the government intervention).
We use the following quantitative separation of direct versus indirect benefits yielded by the optimal
subsidy schedule. First, the learning curve is used with no subsides to develop a counterfactual trajectory
$

of PV cost reductions without subsidy, denoted by 𝐶𝑜 𝑗 (𝑊), with j being an index for year. Given
$

𝑆𝑗 (𝑘𝑊), a schedule of PV subsidies, the resulting PV cost reductions become more rapid, denoted by
$

𝐶𝑗 (𝑊). PV adoption directly induced by the subsidy is:
𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑆𝑗 , 𝐶0 𝑗 ) − 𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑆𝑗 = 0, 𝐶0 𝑗 ) ,

(25)
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The indirect adoption induced is that due to the PV cost reductions resulting from the subsidy:
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑆𝑗 , 𝐶𝑗 ) − 𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑆𝑗 , 𝐶0 𝑗 )

(26)

The total induced adoption is the sum of equations (25) and (26), which is used in assessing net benefits.
2.3.6

Carbon abatement cost

Estimating the abatement costs of a subsidy provides a useful metric that can be compared with other
mitigation options. We calculate public carbon abatement costs in terms of the subsidy expenditure by the
government per mass of reduction. Note that is distinct from the usual definition of abatement cost, which
assessing total costs, both public and private. From the perspective of government and allocation of public
budgets, it is useful to know the public expenditures needed to mitigate carbon. This leads to the
definition:
$

𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝑛𝑜 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠) (𝑡𝑜𝑛) =

𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 ($)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑂2 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑠)

(27)

The denominator embodies the CO2 reductions specifically attributable to the subsidy, as
modeled by its effect on consumer adoption. Solar panels and other technology interventions lead to cobenefits in emission reductions in addition to carbon. The carbon mitigation cost accounting for cobenefits is defined as:
𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝑤/ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠) (

$
𝑡𝑜𝑛

)=

𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 ($)−𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 ($)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑂2 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑠)

(28)

There are many prior analyses of total carbon mitigation cost for solar and other technology
interventions (e.g. Das et al., 2020; Marcantonini and Ellerman, 2013), to our knowledge this is the first
work to assess public mitigation costs as mediated through subsidy stimulated adoption.
2.4 Results and Discussions
2.4.1

Optimal national flexible subsidy starting in 2018

Figure 2 shows results for the optimal national flexible subsidy over the 30-year analysis period from
2018 through 2047. For comparison purposes, we also plot expected schedule for planned/historical US
federal tax credits (FTC) that phase out between 2019 and 2022: a 30% tax credit for 2018-2019, 26% for
2020, 24% for 2021 and zero tax credit afterwards. The optimal national flexible subsidy starts at
$585/kW and declines nonlinearly to zero after 14 years. The optimal flexible subsidy declines over time
because it accounts for technological progress and the resulting cost competitiveness of the technology,
19

reducing the possibility of providing incentives to “free riders” - consumers who would have purchased
solar even without a subsidy. The table in Figure 2 shows outcomes from different subsidy schedules.
First note that the model predicts substantial adoption of residential solar even without subsidy: 19% of
detached households by 2047. This is partly because residential solar is economically attractive in some
states (particularly Hawaii and California) and adoption in these states lowers prices for consumers in
other states. This is also because the diffusion model assumes slow, but continuing, rates of residential
solar even with low NPV. The planned FTC subsidy starts much higher than the optimal subsidy, and
ends much sooner. The model thus suggests that at current prices a more modest subsidy than FTC would
still encourage adoption, but that subsidy should continue longer due to persistent social benefits.

Figure 2. Schedules for optimal national flexible subsidy and planned/historical 30% Federal Tax Credit
(FTC). These results assume real discount rate of 3%, learning rate of 15% and social cost of carbon of
$45/ton. The net benefit is higher and government cost is lower for the optimal schedule compared to
planned FTC ($1.0 billion net benefit and $4.9 billion cost versus -$0.66 billion net benefit and $10.9
billion cost).
Results are sensitive to the values of discount rate, learning rate, and the social cost of carbon. We
conduct a variety of sensitivity analyses. Starting from base values of 3% for societal discount rate, 15%
for learning rate and a social cost of carbon of $45/ton, we allow varying individual parameters to find the
threshold value that results in negative net benefits. Results indicate that net benefits from subsidizing
residential solar fall below zero if the discount rate is above 5%, the solar learning rate is below 6%, or
the social cost of carbon is below $30/ton.
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2.4.2

Retrospective early technology subsidy starting in 2012
Our model suggests that the government should subsidize clean energy technology in its early

stage to maximize the technological learning benefits and gradually reduce the subsidy as the technology
matures. To further examine this argument, we analyze an alternative retrospective case in which the
analysis starts in 2012. Residential solar saw dramatic cost reductions from 2012 to 2018, so 2012 can
serve as a baseline for the “earlier stage”. The optimal national flexible subsidy is compared with a
perpetual 30% FTC for rooftop solar systems. According to the results in Figure 3, our model suggests
relatively high subsidies in the first few years, but aggressively reduces the subsidy over time in both
absolute and percentage terms. While the results suggest that the perpetual 30% tax credit is too high
today (about double the optimal national flexible subsidy in 2018), it was lower than optimal for the years
up to 2014. This demonstrates the importance of subsidizing more at the early stage of technology
adoption and decreasing the support over time as the technology becomes more cost competitive. It also
suggests that if the government provided a more generous subsidy at the very early stage of technology
development, it would have led to greater cost reductions at a faster pace and reduced the need for future
subsidies that are increasingly accessed by free riders.

Figure 3. Optimal national flexible subsidy compared with a perpetual Federal Tax Credit (FTC) of 30%
starting in the year 2012. This comparison shows that government subsidies for solar can be most
beneficial when they are high at the early stage of adoption to get more learning benefits with fewer free
riders, and then reduced over time as the technology becomes relatively mature. The results agree with the
base case results suggesting that the 30% FTC is currently higher than optimal, but also show that the
same 30% credit was too low for years before 2014.
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2.4.3

Direct vs. Indirect benefits
In the introduction we distinguished between the direct environmental benefits of a subsidy, those

due to stimulated adoption, versus indirect benefits, adoption due to future cost reductions driven by the
subsidy. The direct benefit is the discounted emissions reduction benefits resulting from subsidy-induced
adoption while disregarding the effect of the subsidy on technology progress. To calculate this, we
assume that the technology price would follow the same trajectory as the counterfactual no-subsidy case,
meaning that the effects of the subsidy are limited to offset emissions from direct adoption. The indirect
benefit is associated with the additional PV adoption driven by the subsidy-induced technological
progress in the form of cost reductions (technology progress benefits through learning and innovation that
is attributed to the government intervention). We estimated direct and indirect benefits for the optimal
national flexible subsidy. For the optimal national flexible subsidy schedule starting in 2018, 46% of
benefits are attributed to the direct environmental benefit and 54% for the indirect technology innovation
benefit (Figure 4). The total discounted benefit is $6 billion over the 30-year analysis period, with subsidy
cost of $4.9 billion and the net benefit is $1.8 billion as indicated in Table 1. This demonstrates the
importance of accounting for both direct and indirect benefits when justifying subsidy support. For the
optimal national flexible subsidy schedule starting in 2012, we estimate that the indirect technology
benefit accounts for 94% of the net benefits. The larger share for indirect benefits in 2012 versus 2018 is
because that earlier subsidy leads to more significant long-term price reductions. This result asserts that
the main justification for subsidizing early technology adoption is the long-term indirect technological
progress and not the environmental benefits of immediate adoption. From another perspective, note that
sensitivity analysis shows that solar subsidies are not justified if the learning rate falls below 6%. This
indicates that neglecting technological progress when assessing the benefits of a subsidy can lead to
qualitatively different results.
(a) Benefits and cost for optimal national
flexible subsidy schedule starting in 2018.

(b) Benefits and cost for optimal national
flexible subsidy schedule starting in 2012.
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Figure 4. Direct and indirect benefits for the optimal national flexible subsidy schedule starting in 2018
(a) and early technology subsidy schedule starting in 2012 (b). This figure demonstrates the importance of
both the direct environmental benefits and technological progress benefits when evaluating the economic
justification of a subsidy schedule.
2.4.4

State-by-state heterogeneity and state-flexible subsidy

There is significant heterogeneity between states in economic and environmental benefits of
residential solar, driven by differences in electricity prices, solar insolation and grid composition. We first
clarify these differences by showing state-by-state results for our baseline optimal national flexible
subsidy in Figure 5(a,b). This figure shows large differences by state. The highest per capita net benefit
occurs in Wisconsin ($18/person), followed by New Jersey and Indiana ($16/person). In contrast, Hawaii
(-$97/person), California (-$16/person), Connecticut (-$10/person) and Massachusetts (-$9/person) all
show negative net benefits. Negative social net benefits occur in Hawaii, California and New England
states because 1) adoption stimulated by a subsidy is low because PV economics are already favorable,
and/or 2) lower grid emissions in these states leads to lower environmental benefits from solar. Due to
higher solar resources and higher electricity prices, the NPV in 2018 of a rooftop solar system in
California is estimated at $1,140/kW, compared to $896/kW in Massachusetts and -$900/kW in Ohio.
Better economic conditions imply less need for (and thus lower benefits from) a subsidy. To provide an
example of grid emissions differences, the marginal CO2 emission factor in Ohio is 727 kg/MWh versus
422 kg/MWh in California. Differences are even larger for damages from criteria pollutants.
All prior results (including Figure 5a-b) assume a federal subsidy equal across the US, with the
national net benefit determined by summing up net benefits obtained in each US state. Alternatively,
subsidies could be allowed to vary by state, representing a scenario where a federal decisionmaker is
attempting to maximize long-term benefits of the policy for the country as a whole by setting federal
subsidy levels that differ by state. We analyze the case in which flexible subsidy schedules in each state
are optimized to maximize net national benefits, a state-by-state flexible subsidy. While current federal
subsidy policies are typically uniform across the country, there is precedent for the principle of state
variability, e.g. DOE appliance efficiency standards are different by region (DOE, 2016). Following this
idea, we redo the optimization modeling allowing subsidy levels to vary independently in 51 different
regions (50 states plus Washington, DC). Results for state-level net benefits and subsidy costs for
homogenous Federal support versus re-optimized state-by-state subsidies are compared in Figure 5 and
Table 1. A state-by-state flexible subsidy has a notable increase in national net benefits: $2.8 versus $1.0
billion for a national flexible subsidy. Solar penetration also increases from 21% in 2047 for the national
flexible subsidy to 24% for a state-by-state flexible one, and emissions benefits are higher as well.
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Figure 5(c) shows net benefits by state for the optimal state-by-state flexible subsidy. All states
have a positive net benefit, highest in Rhode Island and Connecticut ($18/person) followed by Indiana
and Wisconsin ($16/person) and lowest in Washington ($2/person). The highest per capita net benefits
occur in the Midwest mainly due to larger reductions in coal consumption and in criteria pollutants
(especially SO2). Figure 5 shows state-by-state subsidy levels in the first year (2018). The subsidy starts
as high as $1,250/kW in Missouri and Indiana but has more moderate values of $450/kW - $620/kW in
Florida, Nevada, Arizona, and New Mexico (Figure 6). The optimization results propose low subsidies in
California ($91/kW in 2018) and no subsidy for Hawaii.
National flexible subsidy

(a) Per capita net benefit

(b) Per capita subsidy cost

State-by-state flexible subsidy

(c) Per capita net benefit

(d) Per capita subsidy cost

24

Figure 5. State level results for optimal subsidies.: (a) National flexible subsidy, net benefit per capita, (b)
National flexible subsidy, subsidy cost per capita, (c) State-by-state flexible subsidy, net benefit per
capita, (d) State-by-state flexible subsidy, subsidy cost per capita. For both national and state-by-state
subsidies, the objective is to maximize national net benefits. The differences between states are due to
variations in NPV for residential solar PV resulting from different insolation and electricity prices and the
current electricity generation mix, affecting both the displaced emissions and monetized benefits. For
optimal national flexible subsidy schedule, government expenditure is high in states such as California
and Hawaii but results in a negative net benefit due to overpaying free riders. For the state-by-state
flexible subsidy schedule, all states have positive net benefits. In this case, government investment is
focused on Midwestern states relative to other regions, mainly due to larger benefits from displacing coal
power.

Figure 6. Optimal first-year subsidy level for a state-by-state flexible subsidy schedule. The subsidy starts
as high as $1,250/kW for some states in the Midwest while it offers little to no subsidy for states like
California and Hawaii.
2.4.5

Carbon Abatement Cost

The carbon abatement cost of subsidies is a useful measure to compare subsidies with other
mitigation options. Table 1 summarizes our results obtained for different subsidy schedules, including
both definitions of carbon abatement costs (including and excluding criteria pollutant benefits, equations
27 and 28). Section 2.4.4 has definitions and formula, recall that we assess public (government)
expenditures to mitigate. This is distinct from the total costs (public + private) of mitigation. When
excluding criteria pollutant benefits, the CO2 mitigation costs of optimal subsidies is $45/ton (national
flexible and $49/ton (state-by-state flexible). Mitigation costs are higher with FTC subsidies at $59/ton
(phased out) and $69/ton (perpetual). However, carbon mitigation benefits are much lower if criteria
pollution co-benefits are permitted: $21/ton for nationally flexible subsidy and $17/ton for state-by-state
flexible. Indeed, running the model with only carbon benefits (not shown) leads to much lower optimal
subsidies. Our measure of public mitigation costs is not directly comparable to total mitigation costs, the
latter is the typical measure and has been characterized elsewhere, e.g. (Das et al 2020). Future work to
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characterize public mitigation cost for other technologies would inform government decisions on
allocation of technology promotion subsidies.
A primary theme of this work is that estimates of subsidy benefits should include indirect
technological progress benefits. To understand this effect, we calculate the CO2 mitigation cost of the
optimal national flexible subsidy schedule with no technological progress (learning rate of zero). The
result with zero learning rate is $81/ton of carbon reduced (versus $45/ton with learning rate = 15%),
showing that technological progress plays a large role in reducing estimated mitigation costs of the
subsidy program.
Table 1. Summary results for different subsidy schedules for residential solar. In the no-subsidy case,
adoption and technological progress still occur, leading to emission reductions. Net benefits refers to
benefits of the subsidy (thus zero for no-subsidy) and are estimated over 30 years at 3% real discount rate
and learning rate of 15%. All financial results are in real 2018 dollars. (FTC = Federal Tax Credit). CO 2
Mitigation Cost is the government expenditures spent on subsidies per ton of CO 2 reduced through
stimulated adoption.
Net
Benefit
(billion $)
0

Solar
Penetration
(in 2047)
19%

PV
Price
($/W,
in 2047)
2.50

Reduced CO2
Emissions
(millions of tons,
in 2047)
486

Government
Cost
(billion $)
0

CO2 Mitigation
Cost – No
Criteria Pollutant
benefits ($/ton)
0

CO2 Mitigation
Cost – w/ Criteria
Pollutant benefits
($/ton)
0

1.0

21%

2.43

596

4.9

44.5

21.0

2.8

24%

2.37

704

10.6

48.6

17.1

Planned 30% FTC
(ends 2022)

-0.66

23%

2.39

672

10.9

58.6

26.2

“Perpetual” 30%
FTC
(ends 2031)

-10.0

30%

2.24

1,051

38.8

68.6

38.3

Unsubsidized
Optimal National
Flexible)
Optimal State-byState Flexible)

2.4.6

Sensitivity analysis: discount rates

We conduct additional sensitivity analysis to examine how the results vary under different
assumptions of discount rate (Figure 7). The model optimized at a 5% discount rate (not shown) resulted
in a maximum net benefit of $107 million. This is nine times lower than the base case analysis done with
a 3% discount rate. For this case, the subsidy gives out $278/kW at the initial stage of the support, which
reduces to $5/kW after 12 years. Figure 7 shows the net benefits of our baseline optimal national flexible
subsidy schedule if the discount rate is different than the one assumed. The general trend is expected:
higher discount rates result in lower net benefits from investing in rooftop solar adoption. However,
sensitivity analysis shows that a discount rate of 1% induces lower net benefit than 2%. This is because
these low rates stimulate relatively more natural, non-subsidized adoption (because it essentially lowers
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the experiences cost of rooftop solar), resulting in higher government spending and transfers to free
riders.

Figure 7. Sensitivity analysis results showing the net benefit of the optimal national flexible subsidy for
different discount rates. The results are optimized for the base case analysis (3% discount rate).
2.5 Conclusions and Recommendations
In this research, we present a framework for identifying the optimal government subsidy for
emerging clean energy technologies by modeling dynamic interactions among subsidies, consumer
adoption, technology progress, and environmental benefits. Our results indicate that subsidizing
residential solar in the US delivers net benefits to society (in base case model) and demonstrates the
importance of accounting for technological progress when estimating net benefits. In particular, we show
that the indirect benefits resulting from subsidy-induced technological improvement are comparable to or
larger than the direct environmental benefits associated with the immediate subsidy-induced solar
adoption. This means that the total benefits of the solar subsidy would be significantly underestimated if
the technological learning effect is not accounted for. This holistic approach has distinguished our study
from prior research that focused on the direct environmental benefits of clean energy subsidies. Our
dynamic model shows that government subsidy is particularly important in a technology’s early
development stage because of its effect on technological progress and cost reduction. Meanwhile, the
need for subsidy decreases as the technology becomes competitive enough to attract consumers at
unsubsidized prices. Incorporating this dynamic technological progress perspective justifies a declining
subsidy schedule, as quantified above. To compare our results with prior work, van Benthem et al. (2008)
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determine an optimal subsidy for residential solar in California, with maximal positive net benefit
resulting from subsidy of $3.2/W starting in 2006, falling to $0.78/W in 2016.

These results are

quantitatively similar to the values that we found for a federal subsidy and both analyses indicate a
qualitative trend of initially high subsidy that falls to zero. Important for policy considerations, our
identified optimal national flexible subsidy starting from 2018 is lower than the subsidy level of the 30%
federal tax credit, which suggests that the current policy might be over-subsidizing solar.
It is worth noting that this and other studies model technological progress using a learning rate,
which quantifies the degree to which adoption drives cost reductions. We find that, for learning rates
below 6% (for a national subsidy and 3% discount rate), cost reductions are too slow to justify any solar
subsidy. However, nearly all estimates of solar learning rates exceed 7% (Rubin et al., 2015) and we use
a typical value of 15%. Given these results, future assessments of subsidies and other public sector
interventions for technologies such as electric vehicles, wind power, and energy storage should account
for technological progress as well. This is particularly important for less mature technologies – we found
that indirect benefits accounted for more than 90% of the overall social benefit of a rooftop solar subsidy
in 2012.
Our model also illustrates the geographic heterogeneity in the welfare effect of technology
subsidy. We show that a homogenous national subsidy (with flexible schedules) leads to substantially
different benefits and costs across states, due to heterogeneity in climate and insolation, electricity prices,
energy portfolio, and benefits of increased renewable generation. We also estimate the optimal subsidy
that varies state-by-state, which allows all states to achieve positive net benefits and thus allows more
efficiency gains. Specifically, the total national net benefits increase from $1.0 billion for a homogenous
national subsidy to $2.8 billion for a state-by-state subsidy. Certainly, a Federal subsidy that offered
different levels of support by state would be politically challenging, though there are a few points of
precedence in Federal rulemaking, such as the regional differentiation in DOE efficiency standards (DOE,
2016) and the state-by-state emissions reduction targets in the proposed Clean Power Plan (US EPA,
2015). Furthermore, individual states often supplement the FTC. Our results inform, at least qualitatively,
the beneficial degree of such state-level supplements. It is notable that current state support has the
opposite pattern than the optimal identified in this work, primarily for political reasons: our work suggests
that an optimal subsidy would be focused on the Midwest with lower support in California, New England,
and Hawaii, while actual state policy produces the inverse.
While the US market was the focus of this study, the integrated model can be broadly applied to
other nations or regions to assess the costs and benefits of their government subsidies. Our adoption
model (derived from a global analysis using data that includes Germany and Japan) and the technological
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progress model can be modified by taking the historical PV adoption rate, electricity price, and annual
solar energy production in other countries of interest. The benefit-cost model can be adjusted accordingly
by using other countries’ marginal emissions and damage factors depending on their electric power
systems. In addition to PV, our model can also be applied to other relevant clean energy technologies
including utility scale solar and wind and electric vehicles, or even other industries where technological
adoption has different types of benefits. Alternately, the sophistication of the model could be enhanced by
adding decision-making under uncertainty (through Monte Carlo analysis, for example), integrating
different types of solar technologies, or including categories of benefits or costs neglected here.
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Chapter 3: Roles of diffusion patterns, technological progress and environmental benefits in
determining renewable subsidies
3.1 Introduction
Burning fossil fuels such as coal and natural gas for electricity generation emits greenhouse gases and
pollutants that are a health risk to humans and cause long-term environmental damage. To overcome these
and other negative effects, federal and state governments adopt a variety of programs to promote the use
of clean energy technologies, including subsidies for the installation of or production from renewable
generation. Clean energy technology subsidies can also have a wide range of social benefits which
include advancing innovation in new and early-stage technologies, enhancing energy security, and
promoting economic growth through creation of green jobs. However, clean energy subsidies are
associated with substantial public spending.
A government report shows that the total tax-related credits for solar and wind power are estimated to
be about $12.3 billion and $23.7 billion, respectively, for the years between 2016-2020 (Joint Committee
on Taxation, 2017). While subsidies continue to be an important mechanism to promote clean energy
development and deployment, it is not always clear how federal and state governments design subsidies in
order to balance these costs and benefits. Large renewable energy support plans should attempt to
implement efficient subsidies that maximize the long-term net benefits to society and considering
analytical inputs can be helpful to ensure the cost-effectiveness of the decision making.
There are two primary conceptual justifications for subsidy of clean energy technologies. The first
perspective is that a subsidy prompts immediate consumer adoption of the technology, which yields direct
social benefits in the form of reduced emissions. In other words, the subsidy is meant to stand in for the
environmental benefits that result from offsetting fossil fuel externalities, lowering total social costs. This
direct environmental benefit perspective is well-studied and results often show that the subsidy cost
exceeds societal benefits (Michalek et al., 2011; S. E. Sexton et al., 2018) or estimate a high carbon
mitigation cost (Hughes and Podolefsky, 2015; Macintosh and Wilkinson, 2011). This perspective
implicitly assumes that the technology is stagnant, evaluating it with respect to a temporal snapshot of
costs and benefits.
A second perspective is that the subsidy promotes adoption over time, leading to the development of
new markets and stimulating technological progress. These post-adoption innovations enable further cost
reduction or performance improvement in these technologies (Herron and Williams, 2013; Tsuchiya,
1989) and deliver benefits to society over the long-term. Previous studies identify that diffusion of
various clean energy technologies can be driven by directly incentivizing and as a result lowering the cost
30

of adopting these technologies (Nicolini and Tavoni, 2017; Sarzynski et al., 2012). This idea can be
embedded in a benefit-cost model to find an optimal level of public support, i.e. the subsidy that
maximizes benefits less costs. (van Benthem et al., 2008) evaluated optimal subsidy trajectory for
residential solar PV in California accounting for monetized environmental and consumer benefits and
learning-by-doing externalities that are compared against the total subsidy cost. (Wand and Leuthold,
2011) carried out a similar analysis for residential PV systems in Germany and examined the variability
of net social benefit results under different scenarios.
3.2 Literature Review
In Chapter 2 we have shown how optimal subsidies can vary under different levels of learning rate
and social cost of carbon employed to estimate environmental benefits. Other studies also explore how the
optimal subsidy and the resulting net benefits vary under different conditions related to technological
attributes such as learning rate. For example, (van Benthem et al., 2008) found that below some critical
value of learning rates, public subsidies are no longer justified from a benefit-cost perspective. (Matteson
and Williams, 2015) showed that subsidy spending to reach price parity is much higher when lower
learning rates are assumed. In another case, (Newbery, 2018) investigated how multiple technology
attributes (learning rate, technology capacity factor and social cost of CO2) affect renewable energy
subsidies. The analytical framework presented in (Newbery, 2018) assumes that technologies have a
maximum growth rate and saturation level, and that the optimal subsidy will grow the technology at this
pace until saturation.
While these studies carry out different analyses and identify technology characteristics that may affect
optimal subsidies, none of them conduct an integrated assessment to determine why optimal subsidies for
different technologies are sensitive to these factors. The modeling framework by (Newbery, 2018) does
not include a diffusion model and assumes that an optimal subsidy drives the maximum rate of adoption
until saturation. In contrast, this work uses empirically-calibrated diffusion models and determines
optimal subsidy explicitly by maximizing public benefits less costs. This work contributes to the existing
energy subsidy literature as the first study which explores and compares the effects of various technology
attributes on optimal subsidy patterns, when integrating adoption and marginal emissions models. As a
case study, this chapter takes a comparative approach to address the questions of why and how policy
support should vary for different technologies. This study undertakes a case study comparing utility wind
and residential solar to clarify how differences in three key attributes of a technology affect its optimal
subsidy schedule: environmental benefits, price sensitivity of diffusion, and pace of cost reductions.
These technology attributes are considered to be vital components when justifying the economic
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efficiency of clean energy subsidies (Newell et al., 2019) and have been integrated into government
policy design and analysis studies (van Benthem et al., 2008; Wand and Leuthold, 2011).
The first attribute, environmental benefits, comes from reducing use of fossil generators, the largest
impacts of which come from greenhouse gas and criteria air pollutant emissions (e.g. SO2, NOx PM2.5).
Specifically, the benefits of a renewable energy technology arise from the change in emissions of the grid
that technology is embedded in and thus should vary by region depending on local energy grid mix.
Higher environmental benefits can be gained if the renewable technology is integrated in a grid that is
composed of emissions-intensive generators such as coal and natural gas or is more effective at displacing
emissions from these sources.
The second attribute relates to the rate of technology diffusion. Diffusion models are used to explain
and predict how subsidy and other technology attributes influence adoption. The price sensitivity of
diffusion represents the increase in adoption level in response to a subsidy and is measured in W/$. The
price sensitivity is expected to vary by technology, given that different consumer classes have different
preferences towards technology and value their attributes differently.
The third technology element is cost reduction over time, i.e. at what pace does the technology
become less expensive given adoption and other factors? In this regard, experience curve models applying
learning rates are a common choice to measure cost reductions resulting from subsidy interventions. The
experience accumulated from learning among different technologies depends on the different level of
maturity, rate of adoption, and observed cost reduction. This variation can affect the amount of
investment and policy measures required to bring down the cost of emerging technologies (Neij, 1997;
Neij et al., 2003).
This chapter uses two models to compare the optimal subsidy design for industrial wind and
residential solar generation. The first model applies the integrated framework developed in Chapter 2.
This model, referred to as “model-with-learning”, uses a techno-economic framework that integrates submodels of adoption, technological progress, and emissions benefits to analyze the costs and benefits of
long-term subsidy support. The second model applies a simplified algebraically-solvable framework,
without accounting for technological learning, to establish a direct mathematical relationship between the
environmental benefits and adoption and subsidy design output. This model provides a simple functional
relationship constituting environmental benefits and price sensitivity of adoption to determine the optimal
subsidy of a technology under constant technology price. The two models are quantified using data
disaggregated into 13 US regions as described in the EIA’s “Hourly Electric Grid Monitor” data report
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across the contiguous US (EIA, 2021a). The results from these two technologies are used to better
understand the determinants of optimal energy subsidy. The analysis applies the same models to the two
technologies but comes to different conclusions about the nature of government support, which is
explained and discussed in this chapter.
3.3 Methods: Model-with-learning
In this section, we apply the techno-economic model developed in Chapter 1 for determining the
socially optimal government subsidy schedule for a clean energy technology (Figure 1). The integrated
framework combines three independent models: adoption, technology progress, and environmental
benefits. The three models are interlinked to one another in such a way that the environmental benefits are
estimated from both the adoption induced by the subsidy and the stimulated adoption through technology
cost reduction over a long-term period. The optimization uses a social planner perspective that views
government support (subsidies) as a means to achieve social benefits (emissions reductions). The
objective of the government is to maximize the national net present value defined as the monetized and
discounted emissions benefits minus subsidy cost. This framing thus takes the perspective that the
government is using subsidy to “purchase” emissions reductions now and in the future, including the
indirect effect of technological progress on later adoption. However, this model does not attempt to
account for the economic benefit (or net cost) to the consumer or allocative efficiency between social
groups when identifying the optimal subsidy.
The model is applied to residential solar and utility wind in 13 grid regions in the continental US. EIA
uses these regions to report hourly operating data of the electric power grid (EIA, 2021a). The
geographical map and the labels used to represent these regions are shown in Figure 8 and Table 2. The
geographic variability of wind and solar production and electricity prices calls for a degree of regional
specificity. The 13 regions are domains over which electricity is traded, thus reflecting differences in
wholesale prices, and partly accounts for variability in renewable resource availability.
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Figure 8. Geographical scope of optimal subsidy analysis consisting 13 ISO regions. (EIA, 2021a).
Table 2. Names used to represent the 13 regions on EIA’s “Hourly Electric Grid Monitor” website (EIA,
2021a) and this study.

3.3.1

EIA

This study

California
Carolinas
Central
Florida
Mid-Atlantic
Midwest

CAISO (California Independent System Operator)
Carolinas
SWPP (Southwest Power Pool)
FL (Florida)
PJM (Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland)
MISO (Midcontinent Independent System Operator)

New-England
New York
Northwest
Southeast
Southwest
Tennessee
Texas

NEISO (New England Independent System Operator)
NYISO (New York Independent System Operator)
NW (North West)
SOCO (Southern Company)
SW (South West)
TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority)
ERCOT (Electric Reliability Council of Texas)

Adoption model

There is a large body of literature that creates and evaluates adoption models for clean energy
technologies. Adoption models often use an S-shaped curve to fit technology diffusion over time and may
take on different forms such as Bass, Logistic and Gompertz (Dalla Valle and Furlan, 2011). These
models are applied for long-term forecasting (Dong et al., 2017), comparing technology diffusion
between regions (Dalla Valle and Furlan, 2007; Panse and Kathuria, 2015), and studying adoption among
different sectors (Wang et al., 2017). Other adoption research has used consumer choice models to study
the relationship between various technology attributes and consumer adoption (Islam, 2014), or agentbased models to assess the interaction between consumers, technology manufacturers, and the
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government under a multiple decision-making environment (Zhang et al., 2011). But these adoption
models are often relatively complex and difficult to integrate into analysis of current and future policies
(Gnann et al., 2018; Rao and Kishore, 2010). As a result, the direct application of these models in energy
systems modeling and proposed policy directives has been limited. For that type of analysis, a simpler
model that captures overall trends in adoption is most useful, even if it lacks high-resolution diffusion
data.
The adoption model selected for this study follows the approach developed by (Williams et. al., 2020)
to determine the rate of annual residential solar adoption as a function of Net Present Value (NPV) of the
system. In that work, the parameters of the residential solar model are determined empirically from five
different regions. The model can directly take in policy measures such as subsidies in the NPV estimation.
In this analysis, the residential solar adoption model is directly taken from an earlier study (Williams et.
al., 2020) and the same approach is applied to estimating the adoption model for utility-scale wind
generation. The details of the modified diffusion model for wind power are provided in the following
section.
3.3.1.1 Wind adoption model
To estimate the adoption rate of utility-scale wind power, we modify a diffusion model developed by
(Williams et al., 2020) that effectively reproduced the adoption pattern of residential solar PV using one
explanatory variable: the NPV as experienced by the homeowner. Specifically, the same model is
estimated using annual wind adoption and other observed cost and policy data from four states in the US
(California, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas) and two European countries (Denmark and Germany)
within the time frame of 2002-2018. There are two main reasons for the selection of these regions. First is
data availability. Publicly available and open-source data is used (with sources described in Table 3) for
estimating the NPV and capacity of wind adoption in the regions considered. Second, the observed
adoption of wind in these regions is high on average but varies over time, giving greater variation to
calibrate the model.
The NPV of adopting a wind power plant in a given region is estimated as:
𝑁

𝑁𝑃𝑉 (

$
𝐸∗𝑅
1
) = (−𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ) + ∑
𝑖
(1 + 𝑖𝑛𝑡) 𝐶𝐴𝑃
𝑀𝑊

(29)

𝑖=1

where,
𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 : capital cost of wind power plant ($)
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𝐸: electricity produced by the wind power plant in a year (MWh)
𝑅: revenue from wind electricity generation ($/MWh), mechanism varies by region
int: wind power weighted average cost of capital (%)
𝐶𝐴𝑃: capacity of power plant
N: lifetime of wind power system (20 years)
𝑅 ($/MWh) accounts for the revenue that wind projects receive from electricity generation. It
constitutes the market or contract price of wind energy and all applicable policy incentives. There are a
variety of subsidy mechanisms at the US state and federal level, compensating producers differently,
often proportional to electricity generated. State-level Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) to promote
wind energy, usually achieved through a renewable purchase requirement, are imposed on load-serving
entities. The load-serving entities can meet this requirement either by operating their own renewable
energy facility or by purchasing renewable energy credits (RECs) from independent facilities that
generate electricity from eligible resources (Wiser et al., 1998). For wind power generators, this either
results in a renewable energy credit market, which effectively plays the same role as a production
incentive, or a contracted bundled power purchase agreement (PPA) (market price including RECs).
Hence, the value of 𝑅 in Eq. 2 includes the federal production tax credit (PTC), market value of wind, and
the value of renewable energy credits (RECs) implemented in Texas, Pennsylvania, and New York. For
California, project NPVs are estimated using federal PTC and PPAs signed between wind developers and
the utilities. This data is collected and reported by the states and LBNL. For Germany, 𝑅 represents feedin-tariffs (FITs) and for Denmark 𝑅 is the sum of FITs and electricity market prices (IEA, 2015). The data
sources used to estimate 𝑅 are provided in Table 3.
The adoption model uses regression-produced parameters that are identical in the six regions
considered, assuming that NPV is the sole determinant of adoption. Differences between areas are only
accounted via region-specific data influencing NPV, such as subsidy level, resource availability, and
capacity factor.

The normalized annual wind power adoption is formulated to follow a normal

distribution as a function of the NPV. The functional form of the adoption model is given by:
𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (

𝑀𝑊
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑀𝑊)
𝑁𝑃𝑉 − 𝜇
)=
= 𝑘 (1 + erf (
))
𝑇𝑊ℎ
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑇𝑊ℎ)
𝜎

(30)

where, erf(x) is the error function. 𝜇 and σ, determined empirically, are the NPV that results in peak
increase in wind adoption and the spread in adopter preferences, respectively. As indicated in equation
(30), the annual wind adoption is divided by the remaining electricity generation of each region to
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account for the different sizes of the electricity grids considered. The remaining generation in a given year
is estimated as the total electricity generation in the grid minus cumulative wind power generation. 𝑘
defines the maximum achievable adoption (max adoption = 2k) and is fixed at one half of the maximum
annual wind capacity per TWh of generation. The value of k, estimated by assuming a 35% capacity
factor and a lifetime of 20 years for wind, is 8.2 MW/TWh. Applying non-linear least square regression,
the value of μ is estimated to be $1,589/kW and that of σ is found to be $1,690/kW with a total square
error of 561 MW/remaining TWh. The empirically-fitted adoption model using these values is shown in
Fig. 9. The empirical fit of the model form is better for residential solar than for utility wind, for several
reasons. There is “lumpiness” in utility wind adoption, i.e. larger projects add a discrete block to capacity
in a given year. Also, wind projects experience stochastic delays based on time needed for permitting,
local approvals, and extension of transmission and distribution. In contrast, residential solar in a state is
the accumulation of thousands of small projects, implemented over a time scale of months rather than
years. It is thus not surprising that utility wind adoption does not smoothly follow economic conditions in
a given year.

Figure 9. Adoption model for utility-scale wind generation using the NPV ($/MW) as the explanatory
variable. The model is developed by empirically analyzing wind diffusion data from six regions, with
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data from 2002 to 2018. The adoption curve is fitted using the error function with two regression
parameters μ and σ with values of $1,589/kW and $1,690/kW, respectively, and the value of 𝑘 is set at 8.2
MW/TWh.
Table 3. Wind adoption model data sources.

Region

Wind
Installed
Cost
(Berkeley
Lab,
2019)

NY
(Berkeley
Lab,
2019)
CA
(Berkeley
Lab,
2019)
TX
(Berkeley
Lab,
2019)
PA

Denmark

Germany

(IRENA,
2019)

(IRENA,
2019)

Capacity
Factor
(Berkeley
Lab 2020,
Berkeley
Lab,
2018)
(Berkeley
Lab 2020,
Berkeley
Lab,
2018)
(Berkeley
Lab 2020,
Berkeley
Lab,
2018)
(Berkeley
Lab 2020,
Berkeley
Lab,
2018)
(IRENA,
2019)

Electricity
Price

(NYISO,
2003)

PTC
(IRS,
2002)

REC

(Monitoring
Analytics,
2003)

(IRS,
2002)

(IRS,
2002)

FIT

(NYSERDA,
2017)

(IRS,
2002)

(Potomac
Economics,
2002)

PPA

(Wiser et
al., 2020)
(Wiser and
Bolinger,
2008; Wiser
and Bollinger,
2019)

(PAPUC,
2007)

(Nord Pool,
2020)

(IRENA,
2019)

(Albizu et al.,
2018)
(Federal Network
Agency, 2018;
Hitaj et al., 2014)

Annual
Installation

Total
Generation

Interest
Rate

(Berkeley Lab,
2019)

(EIA,
2019)

(IEA, 2018)

(Berkeley Lab,
2019)

(EIA,
2019)

(IEA, 2018)

(Berkeley Lab,
2019)

(EIA,
2019)

(IEA, 2018)

(Berkeley Lab,
2019)

(EIA,
2019)

(IEA, 2018)

(OECD,
2021)

(IEA, 2018)

(OECD,
2021)

(IEA, 2018)

(IEA, 2019;
IRENAGWEC, 2013)
(German Wind
Energy
Association,
2020)

3.3.1.2 Comparing utility-scale wind and residential solar adoption curves
In the framework, the effectiveness of a subsidy is reflected by the additional adoption resulting from
an increase in subsidy, expressed in Watts adopted per $ of subsidy spent. This adoption price sensitivity
is different for wind and solar for two reasons. First, the underlying adoption curves are different, i.e.
different numerical values for μ and σ. μ = $1,589/kW for utility wind and $7,101/kW for residential
solar, σ = $1,690/kW for utility wind and $4,110/kW for residential solar. Second, the sensitivity depends
on where on the adoption curve the technology starts. For all grid regions except CAISO, unsubsidized
wind has a higher NPV than unsubsidized residential solar.
To show how differences in the adoption curve affect subsidy effectiveness, Figure 10 displays the
adoption curves for utility-scale wind and residential solar. Because of different scales and capacity
factors that impede a comparison in absolute terms, we normalize the adoption from a given NPV by the
adoption resulting at the NPV breakeven point (NPV = 0). In this adoption model, the slope changes with
NPV, positively accelerating over the range of relevant NPV levels. Figure 9 shows that adoption of
utility wind power is more sensitive to changes in NPV than for rooftop PV. Also, a closer look at the left
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side of the plot shows that residential solar adoption rate is higher than utility-scale wind in cases where
NPV is negative, implying that homeowners are more willing to adopt the technology than wind
developers when net losses are possible. These differences could be due to the two different groups of
consumers: homeowners versus power plant developers. A homeowner’s financial decision to invest in
rooftop solar adoption may be focused on offsetting their residential retail electricity cost. But their
decision can also be strongly influenced by consumer attitude towards the environmental benefits of green
energy and indirectly by network effects (Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012; Crago and Chernyakhovskiy,
2016), potentially even outweighing the financial considerations. On the other hand, wind developers aim
to sell the generated electricity into a market, which may be more directly based on financial
considerations. Overall, the different patterns of adoption have further implications on the optimal
subsidy design of the technology. The steepness of the adoption curve determines the amount of induced
adoption resulting from a subsidy and thus the economic effectiveness of the subsidy, with a steeper
adoption curve suggesting more sensitivity to subsidy.

Figure 10. Normalized adoption curves for utility wind and residential solar PV. For both technologies,
the adoption is normalized to the respective value of adoption when Net Present Value=0.
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3.3.2

Technology progress model

The technological progress model applies a one-factor experience curve to forecast technology cost
reductions. A one-factor experience curve gives the unit cost of production as:
𝑃𝑗
𝐶 = 𝐶 ( 0)
𝑃
𝑗

0

−𝛼

(31)

In the equation above, 𝑃𝑗 is cumulative adoption, 𝐶 0 and 𝑃0 are initial cost and capacity values, and
𝛼 is a constant learning coefficient. The fractional cost reduction for every doubling of production is
defined as the learning rate, and is given by LR = 1-2-α. Two-factor experience curves that include
learning from R&D support are also used to model technology cost reductions (Klaassen et al., 2005).
However, their application is restricted mostly due to data availability limitations on public and private
R&D expenditures. Studies have also modified the one-factor experience curve by disaggregating systems
into different component costs, such as PV module and balance-of-system costs in solar PV technologies
(Elshurafa et al., 2018). With the goal of analyzing the impact of learning on optimal subsidy design, we
choose to use the empirically robust one-factor experience curve in our model. The technological progress
model uses a learning rate of 9.8% for wind (Williams et al., 2017) and 15% for rooftop solar estimated
using price data from (IEA, 2017) and cumulative adoption data from (SEIA, 2017).
3.3.3

Benefit-Cost model

The environmental benefit from clean energy technology adoption depends on the energy mix of the
grid. In this research we apply marginal emissions and damage factors to measure the amount of
emissions reductions and the resulting avoided health and climate damages. Marginal emissions factors
are mainly determined by the type of generator displaced, and as a result tend to be relatively higher in
coal-heavy areas like the Midwest than in other regions. The environmental benefits model is based on an
emissions assessment model estimating environmental emissions reductions resulting from changes in
output from conventional power plants (Azevedo et al., 2019). That study estimates the marginal
emissions data from historical emissions and generation data and integrates it with emissions damage
estimates from the EASIUR model (Heo and Adams, 2015). We estimate the present benefits by
discounting the monetized emissions benefits from reduced CO2 and criteria pollutants (SO2, NOx PM2.5)
as a result of the subsidy-induced adoption. In this paper, our goal is to optimize the net social benefit of
a technology subsidy, which is measured as the discounted, monetized environmental benefits minus
subsidy expenditure. This approach is different from other studies that use multi-objective optimization
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model and estimate separately the benefits and environmental costs of certain economic activities such as
export trade (e.g., Wang et al., 2020).
3.4 Model-with-learning results
The integrated model shown in Figure 1 is used to analyze the optimal subsidy schedules for utility
wind. This result is then compared with the optimal subsidies for residential PV estimated using a similar
geographical resolution. The two technologies use the same framework but with different inputs, as
described in Table 4, specifically using different parameters for diffusion, capacity factor, learning rates,
and electricity prices for the two technologies. Project lifetime and emissions offset benefits per MWh
are the same. In both cases, the model uses a non-linear optimization technique to determine an optimal
subsidy schedule. The model applies no constraints on the level or temporal trend of the subsidy, which
can be set to any level in each year.
Table 4. Optimal subsidy model data.

Installed price
Learning rate

Electricity price
Capacity factor
Total generation
Detached households
Marginal emissions factors
Marginal damage factors

Utility-scale wind
(Wiser et al., 2020)
(Williams et al., 2017)
(CAISO, 2018; ERCOT, 2018;
MISO, 2018; NEISO, 2017;
NYISO, 2018; PJM, 2017)
(NREL, 2016a)
(EIA, 2019)
(Azevedo et al., 2019)
(Azevedo et al., 2019)

Residential solar PV
(Berkeley Lab, 2020b)
(IEA, 2017; SEIA, 2017)
(EIA, 2020)
(NREL, 2016b)
(US Census Bureau, 2011)
(Azevedo et al., 2019)
(Azevedo et al., 2019)

This section presents two sets of results for optimal subsidy schedule: a homogeneous subsidy
schedule in which the subsidy level is the same across the 13 regions (effectively a uniform Federal
subsidy) and a heterogeneous subsidy schedule that offers different levels of subsidies for each region
(representing either differentiated regional/state subsidies or the less likely case where a Federal subsidy
varies by location). In both cases, the objective is to maximize the discounted national net benefit.
Fig. 11 shows the homogeneous optimal government subsidy schedule for utility wind and
residential solar, respectively. For utility-scale wind power, the optimal subsidy ranges between
$34/MWh and $38/MWh over the 30-year analysis period (Fig. 11a). On the other hand, our model for
residential solar PV (Fig. 10b) suggests its optimal subsidy should start at $25/MWh and decline to zero
over 16 years. The qualitative difference between these two trends is surprising. The causes of the
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differing wind and solar results are discussed later (and motivates the creation of a “model-withoutlearning”) but are related to the different techno-economic properties of the technologies.

a. Utility wind power

b. Residential solar PV

Figure 11. Uniform federal subsidy schedule that optimizes national net benefits, using the model-withlearning for (a) utility-scale wind power and (b) residential solar PV. The optimal subsidy for utility wind
will be ongoing for the study period whereas the subsidy for solar PV is declining and becomes zero after
16 years.
Figure 12 displays the proposed optimal subsidy schedules that vary across the 13 regions, for
utility wind and residential solar power, respectively. Note that the 13 regions have different electricity
rates and renewable energy potential (capacity factor), both of which influence the NPV of adopting the
technology. The existing electricity grid generation mix also varies across regions, governing the level of
displaced emissions and monetized benefits. As a result, optimal support varies by region. The general
trend of each subsidy remains similar to that of the homogeneous subsidy, but the level of the optimal
subsidy varies for the regions.
The model suggests that wind generation should be subsidized at a higher level in MISO than in
CAISO, the Southwest, or Florida. The reason for this finding is that the current electricity system is
emissions-intensive in MISO and the wind potential is high. The subsidy level for wind power in Florida
is the lowest mainly because of the unfavorable wind resource potential in the region (capacity factor =
21%) as compared with other regions such as MISO (capacity factor = 43%), along with a lower
capability to offset emissions. The marginal CO2 emissions factor in FL is 461 kg/MWh, lower than the
693 kg/MWh in MISO.
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The regional-variable optimal subsidy for residential solar PV declines in all regions, offering the
highest subsidy in MISO and no subsidy in CAISO. The indirect technological progress benefit plays a
major role when accounting for the net benefit of subsidizing rooftop solar. Essentially, the model finds
that technology progress will drive down the cost sufficiently for adoption, and the optimal subsidy
schedule declines as the technology becomes more cost competitive.
a. Utility scale wind

b. Residential solar PV

Figure 12. Subsidy schedules that vary by region that optimize national net benefits, using the modelwith-learning, for (a) utility-scale wind power and (b) residential solar PV. The subsidy for wind is flat
whereas solar subsidy declines over time in all regions. The optimal subsidy differs by region due to
variation in electricity price, wind and solar energy potential, and energy grid mix. The geographical map
and abbreviations used for these regions is given in Section 1 of the SI.
3.5 Methods: Model-without-learning
From Fig. 11 and Fig. 12, the optimal subsidies of utility scale wind and residential solar are
quantitatively and qualitatively different. The subsidy schedule for utility-scale wind stays approximately
the same over the time period, whereas the residential solar subsidy declines to zero. Identifying the
cause(s) of the qualitative differences in subsidy schedules is difficult to explain because the model is
comprised of three independent sub-models simultaneously interacting with one another. The subsidy
determines the adoption through both short- and long-term technology cost reduction, hence, the adoption
and the technology progress models cannot be easily isolated as possible causes. The model also applies a
non-linear optimization that finds the optimal schedule numerically, accounting for direct and indirect
benefits and costs. To further examine the technological factors that determine the optimal subsidy, we
created a simpler model which captures the important features of the model above but simple enough for
the optimal solution to be solved algebraically. This model-without-learning assumes technological
progress to be zero in order to make it mathematically simple. Turning off the technological progress in
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both residential solar PV and utility scale wind technologies allows to account for only the direct adoption
resulting from the subsidy and nullify the adoption stimulated by technological progress.

3.5.1 Benefit-cost analysis
This section begins by assuming the social benefits of clean energy subsidies come from the emission
reduction of induced adoption of the technology, and hence, define the 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡, 𝑁𝐵 ($) as the
monetized emissions benefit from subsidy-stimulated adoption minus the subsidy cost.
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 = 𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝐵 − 𝐴(𝑆) ∗ 𝑆

(32)

where,
𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝐴(𝑆) − 𝐴(𝑆 = 0)

(33)
$
)
𝑀𝑊

𝐴(𝑆)(𝑀𝑊) is the adoption with subsidy, 𝐴(𝑆 = 0)(𝑀𝑊) is the adoption with no subsidy and 𝑆 (

is

the unit subsidy cost. In essence, the benefit of a subsidy comes only from the additional induced
adoption while the cost of the subsidy must be paid to all adopters (including those who would adopt
$

without subsidy). The benefits, 𝐵 (𝑀𝑊) is the discounted environmental benefit of adopting a clean
energy technology over a lifetime of 20 years and is given by:
20

𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 = ∑
𝑖=1

𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒
(1 + 𝐷𝑅)𝑖

(34)

𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒 is estimated from marginal emissions and damage factors of CO2 and criteria
pollutants and 𝐷𝑅 is the discount rate. Substituting Eq. 33 in Eq. 32 and rearranging, the net benefit can
be written as:
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 = 𝐴(𝑆) ∗ (𝐵 − 𝑆) − 𝐴(𝑆 = 0) ∗ 𝐵

(35)

Here, we use a similar approach implemented by Chen and Song (2017) and Fischer and Newell (2005),
and define the policymaker’s objective of determining a subsidy level that maximizes the net benefit.
Thus, we find the first-order differential solution of Eq. 35.
𝜕𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝜕𝐴(𝑆)
= (𝐵 − 𝑆) ∗
− 𝐴(𝑆) = 0
𝜕𝑆
𝜕𝑆

(36)
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The solution to Eq. 8 depends on the adoption curve and the parameters used for defining it. Since
different clean energy technologies can have different adoption curves and adoption parameters, the
optimal solutions vary for different technologies.

3.5.2 Model-without-learning for optimal subsidy level
An adoption model with an exponential curve (equation 9) is used to explain the functional
relationship between a given subsidy level and the resulting adoption. This model is chosen because it has
a similar shape as our preferred error function model in the range of realistic NPVs, has a higher R2 (i.e.,
goodness of fit) value than other types of curves, and is easily differentiable. For the subsidy ranges we
consider in this study, the exponential curve is a very good approximation of our preferred model.
𝐴(𝑆) = 𝐴(0)𝑒 𝑎1 𝑆

(37)

where, 𝑎1 is defined as the price sensitivity of adoption. The unit of 𝑎1 is W/$ and related to the economic
price elasticity of adoption as:

𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 =

𝜕 𝐴(𝑠)⁄𝐴(𝑠)
= 𝑎1 ∗ 𝑆
𝜕 𝑆 ⁄𝑆

(38)

Substituting Eq. 37 into Eq. 36 and solving for the optimal solution gives a rather simple solution:
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 = 𝐵 −

1
𝑎1

(39)

Eq. 39 gives the theoretical optimal subsidy level and defines a mathematical condition for when the
subsidy is justified. For a clean energy technology with an adoption curve as defined in Eq. 37, the choice
1

to subsidize a technology should occur when 𝐵 > 𝑎 . This criterion implies that to justify subsidizing a
1

given technology at the current price, the environmental benefit (in $/MW) should be greater than the
subsidy expenditure per stimulated adoption (also in $/MW). This is a logical, if somewhat simple,
conclusion.
Table 5. Model with and without learning.
Model-with-learning

Model-without-learning

Adoption model

𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑜 + 𝑆 − 𝜇
𝐴(𝑆) = 𝑘 (1 + erf (
))
𝜎

𝐴(𝑆) = 𝐴(0)𝑒 𝑎1𝑆

Optimal subsidy

Numerically solved (non-linear
optimization)

𝑆∗ = 𝐵 −

1
𝑎1
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Federal subsidy type

Heterogeneous (varies over
13regions) or homogeneous
(uniform federal)

Heterogeneous

Learning rate

15% (residential solar) and 9.8%
(utility wind)

0%

3.6 Model-without-learning results
The optimal subsidy level determined by the model-without-learning considers two main factors: the
benefit, B ($/MW) and the price sensitivity of adoption, 𝑎1 (MW/$). The break-even line for subsidizing a
technology is 𝐵 = 1⁄𝑎1 (Eq. 39). Using the data we have collected for the wind and solar models with
learning, we calculate and plot the values of 𝑎1 and B for each region. 𝑎1 is determined by applying
exponential regression curve fitting to the adoption model for each region. 𝐵 is estimated using Eq. 34
considering each region’s marginal emissions and damage data. When estimating the value of 𝐵 in a
particular region, marginal emissions and damage factors are the same for both wind and solar PV
technologies, but differ by capacity factor. Since wind technology has a relatively higher capacity factor
than solar PV, the monetized environmental emissions reduction benefit per MW of adoption is higher for
wind than solar PV and has different geographic distribution. Moreover, as shown in Figure 9, the
adoption curve for wind technology is determined to be steeper than solar, implying that the subsidy
expenditure per stimulated adoption for wind is lower than for solar PV.
Figure 13 shows the values of price sensitivity of diffusion and benefit for residential solar and
utility-scale wind power in the 13 regions. The optimal subsidy, equal to 𝐵 − 1⁄𝑎1 , is positive for wind in
all regions. Meanwhile, optimal subsidy for rooftop solar lies below the break-even line for 9 regions out
of 13.
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Figure 13. Technology attributes ($/Watt of environmental benefits on x-axis, Watt/$ sensitivity of
diffusion to price on y-axis) in 13 grid regions in the US. The green line is derived using the modelwithout-learning model. It is the breakeven point above which a subsidy is theoretically justified. Note
that this simpler model does not include technological progress, which is an important element justifying
solar subsidies.
Figure 14 presents a comparison of the optimal subsidy estimates from the model-withoutlearning and the first-year subsidy level from the model-with-learning, for both technologies. For utility
wind, the optimal subsidies obtained using this model, which assumes zero learning rate, are close to the
estimates from the model incorporating learning rate. This suggests that technology progress plays a
minor role in determining the optimal wind subsidy. Note that the model-with-learning often indicates
lower subsidies than without. This is because technological progress would continue to lower costs,
reducing the need for subsidy. In contrast, the optimal subsidy results for residential solar PV between
from the two models often differ in sign, the model-without-learning indicating a negative subsidy (i.e. do
not subsidize) with the model-with-learning showing a positive one. When accounting for technological
progress, the optimal subsidy of residential solar has increased noticeably, suggesting that technological
progress is a critical part of the argument in favor of subsidy.
a. Utility-scale wind

b. Residential solar PV

47

Figure 14. First-year optimal subsidy level for model-with-learning and model-without-learning in 13 grid
regions for utility-scale wind (a) and residential solar (b). The main difference between the two models is
that the model-without-learning assumes a zero learning rate for both technologies whereas the modelwith-learning uses learning rates of 9.8% and 15% for wind and residential PV, respectively. For utility
wind, optimal subsidy is less affected by learning but in the case of solar PV, the subsidy is much higher
when learning is included.
3.7 Discussions: Linking technology attributes to subsidy structure
To better understand the drivers of differences in the optimal subsidies for wind and solar, the three
sets of technology attributes identified as most relevant, which include cost reductions through technology
progress, adoption sensitivity, and environmental benefits are further examined. Table 6 shows important
input values and various output calculations for utility wind and residential solar. First, for cost reduction,
the learning rate for solar (15%) is larger than wind (9.8%). The subsidy profiles in Figure 12 suggest that
a higher learning rate leads to a steeper slope of subsidy reductions. This is because rapid cost reductions
imply more frequent subsidy adjustment to avoid payments to consumers who would otherwise purchase
at the lower price. Additionally, the results in Figure 13 show that the higher learning rate for solar makes
it a critical part of the justification of subsidies for that technology, unlike wind energy. The results in
Chapter 1 also demonstrate that residential solar provides the most benefits when subsidy starts at a high
level and is phased out over time.
Second, the price sensitivity of adoption is determined from an empirical analysis of NPV and
adoption for both technologies. Relative to residential solar, utility wind adoption accelerates faster for
NPV above zero and falls more quickly when NPV is below zero, partly explained by utilities being more
sensitive to price changes than private consumers. This means that a subsidy-induced shift in NPV has a
stronger effect for wind than for solar, making subsidy a “stronger” influence on wind adoption and
reducing concerns about “free riders” that are not influenced by the government support.
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Third, environmental benefits for a given capacity of wind (0.8-3.4 $/W) are much higher than solar
(0.6-1.2 $/W) in most regions. This is largely due to the higher capacity factor for wind compared to solar
(21-49% versus 14-19%), which leads to higher generation, and thus benefits from a given quantity of
wind capacity. However, environmental benefits are also influenced by the relationship between wind
resource and grid emissions, both of which are geographically dependent (wind resource is strong in the
central US, which is more heavily reliant on coal power). The larger environmental benefits for wind,
combined with its stronger sensitivity of adoption, leads to a qualitatively different subsidy pattern:
optimal wind subsidies persist over time, though with values that vary by region. As wind power is both
more mature and has a lower learning rate, the optimal subsidies are roughly constant over time, rather
than declining, as for residential solar. The model-without-learning shows the combinations of
environmental benefits and diffusion sensitivity that justify an ongoing subsidy.
Table 6. Technology attributes of residential solar and utility wind and optimal subsidies (with and
without technological progress). Range of values reflects results from 13 different grid regions.
Technology attribute
Capital cost in 2019 ($/W)
Capacity factor
Annual income (no subsidy) ($/yr-kW)

Utility wind
1.4
21-49%
48-118

Residential solar
3.8
15-19%
125-264

NPV in 2020 (no subsidy) ($/kW)
Emission benefits ($/W)
Learning rate
Diffusion sensitivity (W/$)
Optimal subsidy ($/MWh) – Model-with-learning

-783-170
0.8-3.4
9.8%
0.97-1.50
18-45, roughly
constant

Optimal subsidy ($/MWh) – Model-without-learning

9-78

-1,939-122
0.6-1.2
15%
0.77-1.09
0 in 1 region; 7-70,
declining to zero over 427 years in 12 regions
0-20

3.8 Sensitivity analysis: discount rates
Our base case analysis so far considers a discount rate of 3% for both residential solar PV and
utility-scale wind technologies. In this section, we analyzed how optimal subsidies for residential solar
and utility wind technologies vary when using different discount rates. Fig. 15 shows optimal subsidies
for these two technologies for discount rates between 1% - 6%. For residential solar PV, optimal
subsidies start as high as $47/MWh when the discount rate is 1%, but the first-year optimal subsidy level
starts to decline when discount rates are increased. The results show that optimal subsidies for residential
solar PV are not justified if discount rates are higher than 6%. On the other hand, optimal subsidies for
utility-scale wind estimated using different discount rates remain relatively the same as the base case
results. For residential solar PV technologies, the government subsidizes higher in the early stages to
stimulate the long-term indirect technological cost reduction benefits. The use of higher discount rates
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accrues lower values of benefits today from future technological progress benefits, implying lower
optimal subsidy. The subsidy for utility-scale wind is mainly justified by the short-term direct
environmental benefits. In this case, both the government subsidy cost and emissions reductions benefit
relatively occur in the same period and are uniform over time. Hence, the discount rate has less effect on
the final result. But, in both cases, the arguments used to justify the subsidy and the qualitative difference
observed between the optimal subsidies of these two technologies remain unchanged.
a. Residential Solar

b. Utility-scale wind

Figure 15. Uniform optimal subsidies for residential solar PV and utility-scale wind for discount rates
ranging between 1% - 6%
3.9 Conclusions and Recommendations
This chapter employs two models (with and without technological learning) to understand the role of
technology attributes in the optimal subsidy design for two important clean energy technologies. The
model-with-learning applies an integrative approach to capture the dynamic interaction between the
constituent elements of adoption, technology progress, and environmental benefits. The setup of the
model makes it difficult to disentangle the relationships between these inputs and conclusions. Hence, this
chapter develop a simpler, more analytically tractable model (model-without-learning) that neglects
technological progress, which allows to solve for explicit relationships between technology attributes and
the optimal subsidy. The model-with-learning indicates an ongoing subsidy for wind is justified in all 13
grid regions, while for residential solar the optimal subsidy schedule declines to zero over time. The
model-without-learning clarifies how region-dependent environmental benefits and price sensitivity of
adoption determine the optimal subsidy. Both models can have practical applications in clean energy
policy design. Studies working on comprehensive analysis integrating both environmental and
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technological benefits of optimal subsidy designs may apply the model-with-learning method while the
model-without-learning can be a better analytical tool when trying to uncover the determinants (different
technological attributes) that drive optimal subsidies. The model-without-learning can also be used for
policy designs of technologies at current price or constant cost assumptions.
The findings in this chapter have specific implications for the ongoing discussion about existing
renewable energy policy. For utility wind, there is a recurring debate at the federal level whether to
continue the Production Tax Credit. One argument to end subsidies is that cost reductions in wind have
led to an industry that no longer needs them. It may be true that the wind industry does not require
subsidy to continue, but the benefit-cost perspective indicates that subsidy continuation is still an efficient
means of realizing public benefits in terms of emission reductions. This analysis highlights that wind
power development does not actually require technology cost reductions to deliver net societal benefits.
However, subsidy for this technology is justifiable and is less dependent on tuning the subsidy schedule to
adjust for cost reductions.
What do these results suggest for policy design in the general sense? First, while government
subsidies for clean energy technologies are well-known in economic theory, there has been limited
research about the optimal subsidy design by technology over the long run (e.g., whether and how the
subsidy levels should be adjusted compared to the past). This research introduces a new perspective that
compares utility wind and residential solar with a similar adoption and subsidy modeling framework, and
accounts for their distinctive technology attributes in their respective optimal subsidy schedules. The
results demonstrate that two superficially similar clean energy technologies (in our case, both are
intermittent renewable electricity sources transitioning to a mature industry) may call for different
government support strategies with different justifications. Specifically, a prior analysis done in Chapter 1
demonstrated that residential solar provides the most benefits when subsidy starts at a high level and is
phased out over time. But for utility wind, the story appears to be different: due to somewhat stronger
environmental benefits and a customer base that is more sensitive to financial elements, a continual
subsidy is preferred. This analysis also suggests that the arguments we use to support other clean energy
technologies should be carefully considered: a “one size fits all” policy design is not appropriate. Instead,
the details of optimal policy support depend on each technology’s techno-economic characteristics.
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Chapter 4: Informing optimal subsidy for residential solar: the role of technology adoption
modeling uncertainties
4.1 Introduction
In the US, federal and state governments have employed different subsidy programs to promote clean
energy technology adoption. The subsidies target different sectors, including technology manufacturers
and end-use consumers. These policies are intended to reduce the environmental impacts of greenhouse
gas emissions from fossil fuel consumption when generating electricity. The policies can also drive
technology development and innovations in emerging technologies for broader adoption in the future.
However, renewable energy subsidies require substantial financial investments and public spending.
Hence, careful planning and design accounting for model and parameter uncertainties are essential to
ensure long-term economic and social benefits.
Uncertainties pose a critical challenge to the robustness of energy system models forecasting longterm energy trends. Energy system models employ different techniques to predict future capacity
additions and give prospects on the roles and performances of renewable energy technologies. These
models rely on several parameters and system representations contributing to uncertainties. Parameters
are input variables to the model and represent different driving factors, such as future technology price
and innovation, economic growth and electricity demand, and policy choices. These inputs are forecasted
and can significantly deviate from actual trajectories. Modeling errors also occur when reproducing realworld systems and decisions.
Studies have applied various techniques to integrate and analyze uncertainties in energy system
models and policies. Scenario analysis is widely used to study the effect of uncertainty on future energy
technology portfolios (Olaleye and Baker, 2015) and climate policies (Clarke et al., 2009). (Paltsev, 2017)
discusses that scenario analysis can be helpful to qualitatively study the risks and benefits associated with
various policies and investment decisions but points out that this analysis does not account for the
complex nature of energy systems; as a result, it consistently underestimates the projections of clean
energy adoption and generation. A different approach involves using probabilistic distribution to
characterize uncertainties in model parameters. Pizer (1999) shows that accounting for uncertainty in
various climate and economic parameters leads to higher optimal tax policy than the analysis done when
employing an average value. A study by Marangoni et al. (2017) determines an optimal R&D portfolio
program across four clean energy technologies by considering the uncertainty involved with future
technology learning rates. This paper shows that applying a distribution of learning rate values in the
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portfolio analysis results in a higher R&D investment than the case where a single deterministic learning
rate value is used. In contrast, the investment ranking across the technologies remains the same.
Another aspect of uncertainty analysis discussed less often in literature focuses on model uncertainty.
This analysis involves investigating the effect of uncertainty that exists in the model or structure used to
represent the real-world system under study (Morgan et al., 1990). Morgan et al. (1990) point out that
model uncertainty can affect the outcome of the analysis considerably, whereas Gillingham et al. (2015)
show the variance in climate model outcomes is mainly explained by parameter uncertainty than
structural uncertainty. Studies have looked at the effect of model uncertainty through a systematic
comparison of various energy models, and results show that model choices have a notable impact on
future renewable energy projections (Blair et al., 2009; Luderer et al., 2017; Mai et al., 2018) and capacity
expansion planning (Henry et al., 2021). Bistline et al. (2020) carried out multiple model-intercomparison
under similar scenarios to determine renewable policy coordination impacts on energy system models
across countries. Their study shows that model results may vary because of input assumptions, structural
decisions framework, and spatial and temporal resolution differences. In addition to these studies in which
the outcome of different models is compared, researchers have also explored results from multiple
modeling alternatives within a single framework. A paper by (Goulder and Mathai, 2000) shows that
optimal CO2 abatement and carbon tax policies vary when different technical change models and policy
optimization criteria are considered. A study by (Cohen et al., 2016) applies two different demand
models, linear and non-linear, to determine the impact of demand uncertainty on optimal subsidy. This
study considers different forms of demand models to show that policymakers will under-subsidize if
demand uncertainty is ignored, regardless of the type of demand function. But they show that consumer
benefits can be higher or lower with uncertainty, depending on the type of demand function used.
Studies have indicated serious concerns about the robustness of forecasts for electricity system
models. For example, the World Energy Outlook model from the International Energy Agency has
consistently and drastically underpredicted solar power capacity additions (Hoekstra 2018). In 2000, the
Annual Energy Outlook “forecasts” from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) report U.S. wind
capacity in 2020 as 6 GW for the “Reference case” and 18 GW for the “High renewables case” (EIA
2020). The actual Wind Capacity in 2020 was 118 GW, over five times higher than even the optimistic
case for renewables. It is also observed that there is a lack of consensus among model results in which
different models produce disparate results for policy related outcomes. For example, estimates of the cost
to mitigate 25% of U.S. carbon emissions vary from $40-$300/ton, depending on the model (Sanstead
2015). In these instances, it is unclear whether parameters, models or combinations of these two factors
contributed to the uncertainty and deviations from actual trends.
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Previous studies have developed different methods integrating several parameters and models to
analyze optimal subsidy designs for clean energy technologies (Tibebu et al., 2021b; van Benthem et al.,
2008). These models are essential to determine different technology characteristics affected by the policy.
For instance, the models can be useful for predicting subsidy induced consumer adoption and long-term
technology cost reductions. The models can also be applied to measure emissions reduction benefits
resulting from the policies. But these models constitute uncertainties inherent to both parameter selection
and model formulations which can have implications on the outcomes and policy recommendations.
Research by Tibebu et al., (2022) used residential solar PV and utility-scale wind technologies to show
that diffusion parameters are one of the determinant factors when justifying clean energy subsidies. This
implies that any uncertainty in the parameters and diffusion pattern modeling would directly impact the
policy design. Studies have indicated that different diffusion models disagree on the estimated adoption
levels. Dong et al. (2017) used multiple diffusion models to forecast residential solar PV in California and
determine the impact of different policy changes on PV adoption. Their results show that the baseline
peak annual installation difference across the models is about 500 MW and indicate that top-down
methods are not suitable for long-term impact analysis on adoption, but their study is not clear on where
the difference in the results originated. This study aims to analyze how different modeling and parameter
alternatives of a critical element, i.e., the diffusion model, affect practical policy decisions.
In this study, we analyze the role of adoption model uncertainties when designing clean energy
subsidies. We determine the optimal subsidy that maximizes social net benefits for residential solar PV in
the US using combinations of different adoption model functions and variables. Other studies have
previously used the models and variables we selected to determine residential solar adoptions and analyze
different policies. The models are calibrated with county-level residential PV price, adoption, and sociodemographic data from three states, namely Arizona, California, and Massachusetts. The goodness of fits
of the models are compared using statistical measures but evaluating nonlinear regressions and
correlations in some explanatory variables makes it challenging to select a single best model. We also
performed a retrospective prediction to compare and validate model forecasts and accuracy.
This research contributes to the methodology and analysis of optimal government policy design tools
by exploring the effects of uncertainties in model and parameter choices on subsidy schedules for clean
energy technologies. Although the study by Dong et al. (2017) compared the forecasts of different
diffusion models, they did not evaluate how the different outcomes may affect future policy decisions. In
addition, the framework they considered either did not explicitly account for technological progress or is
determined exogenously. Gillingham et al. (2015) consider combinations of modeling choices by different
groups. Our result clarifies how important individual modeling choice affects decision outcomes. The
54

paper by Cohen et al. (2016) considers two functional forms with only one parameter, i.e., price, in both
cases. In this study, we show how consideration of additional explanatory variables and increased
complexity would affect optimal subsidy design. Cohen et al. (2016) also point out that their analysis is
carried out for a single-period model. Hence, further study is required to determine the effect of
uncertainty on subsidy schedules accounting for the role of technological progress over time.
4.2 Methods
In this section, we consider three different adoption models with single and multiple explanatory
variables. These models are then used to explore the effects of functional formulations and parameter
choices on optimal policy design using a techno-economic framework.
4.2.1

Techno-economic framework

In this study, we apply a techno-economic framework developed by Tibebu et al. (2021) that is used
to analyze state-level residential solar PV subsidies. The framework constitutes adoption, technology
progress, and benefit-cost models. The adoption and technology progress models are run iteratively to
synthesize technology diffusion induced directly by a government subsidy and indirectly by technology
cost reductions. In this framework, the benefits of the government subsidy are justified using the direct
environmental benefits from emissions reduction and the indirect technological progress benefits. The net
benefit of the policy intervention is estimated using the benefit-cost model that compares the monetized
public benefits from emissions reductions resulting from the subsidy-stimulated adoption and the
government cost. The framework also implements an optimization tool to determine the optimal subsidy
schedule that maximizes the national net benefit, i.e., the benefits minus the cost, from the government’s
perspective. We used this framework to analyze the effects of different adoption model formulations on
the optimal subsidy design for residential solar PVs.
4.2.2

Adoption models

Research works on policy design for renewable technologies implemented different diffusion models
to study the impacts of different policy instruments on renewable technology adoption. These studies
applied different forms of mathematical formulations to model the diffusion process based on the
economic attractiveness of the technology (Tibebu et al., 2021b; van Benthem et al., 2008). Other studies
used system dynamics theories to account for the interaction among different PV market factors such as
national energy mix, economic status, and environmental goals (Jeon et al., 2015). Statistical methods
with multiple variables, including past cumulative installations, government incentives, and techno-
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economic and socio-demographic variables, are also used to model PV diffusion (Dong, 2014; Müller and
Trutnevyte, 2020).
This study uses three diffusion models from the literature (Table 7). Different studies previously
developed these three models to analyze the diffusion of clean energy technologies. In the first model,
consumer adoption is formulated using an integral of Gaussian distribution resulting in an error functional
form. The second diffusion model uses a mixed log-linear regression. The third model develops
residential solar market purchase decisions considering that the probability of adoption for a given
consumer is determined by integrating an extreme value distribution which gives a logit function demand
model. We also consider three cases of each adoption model. The first case uses only the economic
variable, the Net Present Value (NPV), as the primary driver of technology adoption. The second case
includes a multi-variable model constituting economic and socio-demographic variables, including per
capita personal incomes, unemployment rates, and population density at the county level. The third case
applies financial and consumer awareness of the technology accounted through the share of previous
technology adoption. These adoption models are integrated into a single techno-economic framework to
determine the socially optimal subsidy for residential solar PV.
Table 7. Model names and theoretical framings for three adoption models with three different functional
forms consisting of single and multi-variable explanatory variables.
Functional
Forms
Error function
Mixed log-linear
Logit

Model Framing
Adoption is modeled as an integral of a
Gaussian distribution
Adoption is modeled by logarithmically
transformed regression model
Probability of adoption is modeled as
integral of extreme value distribution

NPV

Explanatory Variable
NPV and socioNPV and previous
demographic
cumulative adoption

ERF_NPV

ERF_NPV+Socio

ERF_NPV+Adopt

MLL_NPV

MLL_NPV+Socio

MLL_NPV+Adopt

Logit_NPV

Logit_NPV+Socio

Logit_NPV+Adopt

We used different data to estimate the three adoption models (Table 8). All three adoption models are
developed by using historical county-level residential solar PV adoption and price data from three states,
namely Arizona, California, and Massachusetts. The economic factor, NPV, is the discounted financial
benefit of adopting residential solar PV over a lifetime of 20 years. The NPV is estimated using
residential solar PV price, incentives, and adoption data gathered from Berkeley Lab’s Tracking the Sun
report (Barbose et al., 2021). We compiled annual PV systems installed in 48 counties from the three
states. The data time frame spans from 2005-2019 for most counties, while for others, the available start
year falls between 2007-2010. We used NREL’s PVWatts calculator to determine each county's annual
solar energy production (NREL, 2016b). The residential electricity price of the utility with the largest
number of PV customers in each county is obtained from EIA (EIA, 2021b). Socio-demographic data
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employed in our study, including income and unemployment rate, are collected from (BEA, 2021; US
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2021). We estimate population density by compiling population and land area
data from (BEA, 2021; US Census Bureau, 2021). The demographic data are assumed to be exogenous
when integrated into the techno-economic framework. We used annual data from 2000-2019 and
performed a simple linear regression to project income and population. We used the mean of yearly rates
for the unemployment rate from 2000-2019. The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the three
adoption models are shown in Table 9.
Table 8. Data sources for residential solar PV adoption model fittings.
Variable
Data source
Residential solar PV price, incentives,
and adoption
Barbose et al. (2021)
Solar insolation
NREL (2016b)
Electricity price
EIA (2021)
Income
BEA (2021)
Unemployment rate
US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2021)
Population
BEA (2021)
Land area
US Census Bureau (2021)
Table 9. Descriptive statistics of the variables used for fitting the adoption models.
Variable

Unit

Annual Adoption
Annual Adoption
NPV
Income
Unemployment
Population Density
Prior Adoption
Observations

MW/million free detached houses
Watt/capita (log)
$/kW
$/capita (log)
%
Population/mile sq. (log)
Share of households with PV (log)

Mean

Std.Dev

Min

Max

69
1.6
236
10.9
7.5
5.9
-1.9
655

82
1.4
1,918
0.3
3.9
1.4
0.8

0.14
-3.1
-5,636
10.2
2.3
3.2
-4.4

442
4.1
3,305
11.9
27.5
9.8
-0.5

The details of the three adoption models are discussed below.
4.2.2.1 Error Function Model
The first adoption model used in this study is derived from a residential solar diffusion model
developed by Williams et al. (2020). This model exclusively uses an economic factor – the Net Present
Value (NPV) of adopting rooftop solar system over a 20-year period – consisting of government
incentives, electricity price and solar energy potential. Adoption is formulated as the integral of a normal
distribution that is mathematically modeled by using an error function (Equation 1).
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑛 (

𝑀𝑊
𝑁𝑃𝑉 − 𝜇
) = 𝑘 (1 + erf (
))
𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝜎

(40)
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where, 𝜇 and 𝜎 are empirically determined parameters. In addition to the adoption variables shown in Eq.
1, we also consider two alternative cases consisting additional variables. We employ a multi-variable
adoption model as a function of NPV and socio-demographic variables (Eq. 41) and NPV and previous
years adoption (Eq. 42).
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (

𝑀𝑊
)
𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠

= 𝑘 (1 + erf (

𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (

𝑁𝑃𝑉 − (𝛼1 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝛼2 ∗ 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼3 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑛_𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛼4 )
𝛼5 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝛼6 ∗ 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼7 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑛_𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛼8

))

(41)

𝑀𝑊
)
𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠

𝑥
𝑁𝑃𝑉 − (𝛽1 ∗ log ( 𝑡−1 ) + 𝛽2 )
𝑀𝑡
= 𝑘 (1 + erf (
))
𝑥𝑡−1
𝛽3 ∗ log (
) + 𝛽4
𝑀𝑡

(42)

A non-linear least square method is applied to estimate the values of the parameters and the results are
given in Table 10.
Table 10. Estimated values of the parameters using least square method.

𝜇

𝜎

Dependent variable: Annual Adoption Watt/capita (log)
Models
ERF_NPV+Adopt
ERF_NPV
ERF_NPV+Socio
Income
966
Unemployment
-197
Population Density
8074
-166
Prior Adoption
4.36E+21
Constant
1.35E+21
2
Income
665
Unemployment
-150
Population Density
4679
-245
Prior Adoption
2.26E+21
Constant
5
-1.4E+15
655
Observations
655
655

4.2.2.2 Regression Model
The second diffusion model implements a mixed log-linear regression to predict adoption. This type
of model has been extensively used to analyze the adoption of clean energy technologies (Davidson et al.,
2014; Drury et al., 2012). The first model (Eq. 43) uses only the NPV as the main predictor variable,
while model 2 (Eq. 44) and model 3 (Eq. 45) incrementally include more variables to account for sociodemographic factors and past adoptions, respectively.
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𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,

𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,

𝑊
(𝑙𝑜𝑔) = 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑁𝑃𝑉 + 𝛽𝑜 + 𝜀
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎

(43)

𝑊
(𝑙𝑜𝑔)
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎

= 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑁𝑃𝑉 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 ) + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)
+ 𝛽𝑜 + 𝜀
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,

where, 𝛽𝑖 and 𝜀

(44)

𝑊
(𝑙𝑜𝑔) = 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑁𝑃𝑉 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝛽𝑜 + 𝜀
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎

(45)

represent the empirically fitted coefficients and the error term, respectively. The

economic and socio-demographic explanatory variables we considered in our study, which include
income, unemployment rate, and population density, are found to be significant PV adoption predictors in
different studies (Dharshing, 2017; Drury et al., 2012; Müller and Trutnevyte, 2020).
We carried out ordinary least square regression to estimate the coefficients of the variables. Table 11
shows the results of the regression for the three cases. The R2 for the first model consisting of only the
NPV variable is 58%. This indicates that this variable can explain most of the data variation in the
adoption. Adding socio-demographic variables in the second model has increased the adjusted R2 to 64%.
The second model shows that unemployment and population density coefficients are negative. This result
implies that areas with high unemployment and population density tend to have lower adoption rates. The
third model with NPV and share of previous years’ adoption as explanatory variables have the highest
adjusted R2 value due to the correlation between the NPV and prior adoption rates. In this model, the
coefficient of NPV is seen to vary significantly from the estimates obtained in models 1 and 2.
Table 11. Parameter coefficient estimates for predicting annual adoption using mixed log-linear
regression.
Dependent variable: Annual Adoption Watt/capita (log)
Models
MLL_NPV
MLL_NPV+Socio
MLL_NPV+Adopt
NPV
0.000568***
0.000544***
0.000130***
(0.000019)
(0.000018)
(0.000019)
Income
0.604265***
(0.169458)
Unemployment
– 0.049573***
(0.01062)
Population Density
– 0.287913***
(0.032915)
Prior Adoption
1.295935***
(0.042542)
Constant
1.477420***
– 3.033669*
4.045906***
(0.036548)
(1.771840)
(0.087528)
655
Observations
655
655
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R2
0.579755
Adjusted R2
0.579112
Residual Std. Error
0.928377
F Statistic
901***
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

0.638136
0.635909
0.863468
287***

0.826580
0.826049
0.596836
1,554***

4.2.2.3 Logit demand function model
For the third model, we employ an adoption model developed by Lobel and Perakis (2011). The
demand for solar panel at time t, 𝑞𝑡 , is given by a logit demand model as shown in Eq. 46.

𝑞𝑡 = (𝑀 − 𝑥𝑡−1 ) ∗ (

𝑒 𝑉(𝑡)
)
1 + 𝑒 𝑉(𝑡)

(46)

where, 𝑀 is the total market size, 𝑥𝑡−1 is the number of households that have already adopted solar PV,
and 𝑉(𝑡) is the consumers' utility profile for adopting solar PV. The first term of Eq. 46 represents the
number of remaining households who have not yet purchased solar PV at time t and the second term is the
probability of adoption for these customers. The original demand model presented in Lobel and Perakis
(2011) assumes that a consumer’s perceived utility and their decision to purchase solar panels is mainly
influenced by the economic benefit (NPV) and the number of households that have already adopted solar
PV (representing familiarity with the technology). The later component represents the effect of
information spread and consumer awareness of the technology on diffusion patterns and is assumed to be
proportional to the log of fraction of customers with PV (Eq. 47).
𝑥𝑡−1
𝑉(𝑡) = 𝑎 ∗ 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑡 + 𝑏 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
)+𝑐+ 𝜀
𝑀

(47)

where, 𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐 are empirically determined demand parameters. 𝜀 is the error term referring to the
demand shock that is not captured by the data. In this model only deterministic components are
considered and 𝜀 is set to zero. From Eq. 46 and 47, the demand function can be written as:

𝑞𝑡 = (𝑀 − 𝑥𝑡−1 ) ∗ (

𝑒

𝑥
𝑎∗𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑡 +𝑏∗𝑙𝑜𝑔( 𝑡−1 )+𝑐
𝑀

1+𝑒

)
𝑥
𝑎∗𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑡 +𝑏∗𝑙𝑜𝑔( 𝑡−1 )+𝑐
𝑀

(48)

Rearranging Eq. 48 yields a linear function that can be used to determine the parameters of the demand
model (Eq. 11).
ln (

𝑞𝑡
𝑥𝑡−1
) = 𝑎 ∗ 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑡 + 𝑏 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
)+𝑐
𝑀𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡
𝑀

(49)
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In addition to the model discussed above, we consider two modified models that include either the
single NPV variable (Eq. 50) or multiple variables capturing socio-economic factors (Eq. 51). In the
single variable model, we assume that consumer’s utility is driven mainly by NPV whereas in the multivariable model we account for additional socio-demographic factors.

𝑞𝑡 = (𝑀 − 𝑥𝑡−1 ) ∗ (

𝑒 𝛽1 ∗𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑡+𝛽𝑜
)
1 + 𝑒 𝛽1 ∗𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑡+𝛽𝑜

(50)

𝑞𝑡
= (𝑀 − 𝑥𝑡−1 ) ∗ (

𝑒 𝛽1 ∗𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑡+𝛽2 ∗𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)+𝛽3 ∗𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡+𝛽4 ∗𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)+𝛽𝑜
)
1 + 𝑒𝛽1 ∗𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑡+𝛽2 ∗𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)+𝛽3 ∗𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡+𝛽4 ∗𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)+𝛽𝑜

(51)

Table 12. Parameter coefficient estimates for logit demand models.
Dependent variable: ln (

NPV

(1)
0.000550***
(0.000019)

Income
Unemployment
Population density

Models
(2)
0.000535***
(0.000019)
0.459858**
(-0.181206)
-0.029721***
(-0.011356)
-0.118731***
(-0.035196)

Prior adoption

)

(3)
0.000064***
(0.000016)

-5.260578***
(0.036997)

-9.346431***
(1.894669)

1.437034***
(-0.036427)
-2.412440***
(0.074947)

Observations
655
R2
0.557722
Adjusted R2
0.557045
Residual Std. Error
0.939796
F Statistic
823***
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

655
0.57505
0.572434
0.923326
220***

655
0.869418
0.869018
0.511046
2,171***

Constant

4.2.3

𝑞𝑡
𝑀𝑡 −𝑥𝑡

Model Evaluation

We have compared the three models using the total squared error (TSE) and the residuals, which is
the difference between the actual and the predicted values. But this metric may not be ideal for measuring
the models’ quality in forecasting adoption. Even though Table 13 shows that the error function and the
logit models with NPV and prior adoption variables have the lowest TSE, these models overestimate the
adoption level when forecasting (shown in the results section). It is also seen that the TSE of the error
function and logit models do not change significantly when adding socio-demographic variables.
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Table 13. Total squared error of the adoption models fitted using historical county data.

Functional Forms
Error function
Mixed log-linear
Logit

NPV
1399
1585
1716

Explanatory Variable
NPV and socioNPV and previous
demographic
cumulative adoption
1342
1192
1481
1598
1715
1247
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Figure 16. Historical data and residual plots for different adoption models. An error function, mixed loglinear regression and logit functions are used to model adoption trends.
Each model is fitted using a single (NPV) and multiple (NPV and socio-demographic or NPV and prior
adoption) explanatory variables.
Table 14 shows the correlation matrix between the different explanatory variables. NPV and prior
adoption have the highest correlation, 0.8, followed by income and population which is about 0.7.
Table 14. Correlation matrix.

NPV
Income
Unemployment
Population density
Prior adoption

NPV
1
0.17
-0.24
-0.01
0.82

Income

Unemployment

Population
density

Prior
adoption

1
-0.60
0.69
0.22

1
-0.32
-0.32

1
-0.02

1

4.3 Results and Discussions
In this section we first compare the different adoption curves presented in the methods section. Then
we show how these models affect the optimal subsidy design for residential solar PV.
4.3.1

Adoption Curves

We compared the different adoption models by plotting them on the same graph. Figure 17 shows the
annual adoption predicted using the models as a function of the NPV. We plot the adoption as a function
of the NPV mainly because government subsidy influences PV adoption by changing its relative price, or
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the NPV. Since our primary goal is to look at the relationship between adoption models and subsidy
design, we are not plotting the diffusion curves against other variables.
Looking at only the single variable models (Figure 17-left), the error function model has the steepest
slope than the mixed log-linear and logit models. This implies that subsidies can stimulate more adoption
when employing the error function model than the others. Figure 17-right shows additional adoption
curves fitted using the multi-variable models consisting of socio-demographic and prior adoption
variables. Here, the adoption models consisting of prior adoption as an explanatory variable result in a
higher adoption for low NPV values, subsequently driving future adoptions and restricting the need for
government subsidies at the later stage.

Figure 17. Adoption prediction comparison for the three models as a function of the NPV. Figure on the
left is adoption curve for the single variable adoption models. Figure on the right is adoption curve for all
three cases of the models. A smooth line curve is fitted for those models with scatter plots.
4.3.2

Forecasting Residential Solar PV Adoption

The three adoption models are integrated into the techno-economic framework to determine the
residential solar PV adoption level resulting from a given subsidy. In this case, we performed a
retrospective forecasting starting from 2012 by considering residential solar PV federal tax credit subsidy
policy as planned by the government. This subsidy offers 30% of the investment as a federal tax credit
(FTC) for systems installed before 2020. The credit is lowered to 26% for installations between 2020–
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2022, to 22% for systems connected in 2023, and is expected to expire after 2024. Figure 18 shows the
annual residential PV diffusion in the US predicted by the techno-economic framework using the different
adoption models. The error function model consisting of the prior adoption variable forecasts the highest
diffusion rate, with peak annual adoption reaching about 16 GW in 2024. The mixed log-linear and logit
models with the same explanatory variables are also observed to predict a higher adoption rate than the
rest of the models, even after the FTC expires.

Figure 18. US annual adoption starting from 2012 with planned 30% FTC and learning rate of 15%
predicted by the different adoption models.
Figure 19 shows the impacts of the 30% FTC subsidy on residential PV adoption for the different
models. The figure shows US PV adoption predicted by each model with and without this subsidy. The
gap between the two curves represents the stimulated adoption due to the subsidy. The subsidy induces
more adoption for the error functions model with NPV and socio-demographic variables than the rest of
the models. The no-subsidy adoption trends seem higher for the mixed log-linear and logit demand
models than for the error function model.
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Figure 19. US annual adoption starting from 2012 with planned 30% FTC subsidy that expires in 2024
and no subsidy at LR of 15%.
4.3.3

Optimal Subsidy

The adoption models are also integrated into the techno-economic framework to estimate optimal
subsidies for residential solar. The techno-economic framework applies adoption, technological progress,
and benefit-cost model to determine the optimal subsidy that maximizes national net benefit, i.e., benefits
resulting from emissions reductions and technological progress minus the subsidy cost. Fig. 20 shows the
optimal subsidy results for different cases of learning rate and social cost of carbon. For the base case
learning rate of 15% and carbon cost of $45/ton, optimal subsidy estimates are zero for all adoption
models except the ERF_NPV and ERF_NPV+Socio (Fig. 20(a)). When the social cost of carbon is
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increased to $85/ton, the mixed log-linear models with NPV alone and NPV and socio-demographic
variables result in optimal subsidies starting at $250/kW and $330/kW (Fig. 20(c)). For the technoeconomic model with logit demand adoption models (Logit_NPV and Logit_NPV+Socio), subsidies
stimulate adoption and result in net benefits when a higher learning rate and social cost of carbon are
considered.

Figure 20. Optimal subsidy schedule for sample cases of learning rates and social costs of carbon. The
results show that optimal subsidy schedule estimates vary considerably when different adoption models
are used.
Figure 21 shows the first-year optimal subsidy level for different learning rates and social costs of
carbon. The optimal subsidy is mostly zero for lower values of learning rate and carbon cost in all cases.
The figure shows that the optimal subsidies are zero when the prior adoption variable is used in the error
function and logit demand function adoption models. For the mixed log-linear model, a high subsidy
value is offered in the early period to stimulate adoption, which could, in turn, drive adoption in the later
years. The optimal subsidy obtained with a given adoption model is very close for the single variable with
NPV and the multi-variable models with NPV and socio-demographic variables. This indicates that the
model choice may impact the optimal subsidy schedule estimates more than adding socio-demographic
variables considered in this study.
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Figure 21. First year optimal subsidy determined using the different adoption models for different values
of learning rate (%) and social cost of carbon ($/ton).
4.4 Sensitivity analysis: discount rates
The optimal subsidies estimated above apply a discount rate of 3%. We carried out a sensitivity
analysis using discount rates ranging from 1%-5%. Fig. 22 shows the optimal subsidies for residential
solar PVs for three adoption models employing single variable (NPV) and multi-variable (NPV+Socio)
parameters at a learning rate of 20% and a social cost of carbon of $85/ton. Similar to the observation in
Chapter 3, the first-year optimal subsidies are lowered for higher discount rate values, but the subsidy
declines at almost the same rate as the base case value. Higher discount rates imply lower accrued
benefits which are accounted through long-term technological progress and cost reductions.
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Figure 22. Optimal subsidy design using different discount rates at a learning rate of 15% and social cost
of carbon of $45/ton.
4.5 Conclusions and Recommendations
This research studies the impacts of adoption model formulation and parameter choice on optimal
subsidy design for residential solar PVs. We analyzed three adoption model functional forms with three
combinations of explanatory variables within a single techno-economic framework. We show how policy
decisions vary using these different models and examine the results under different technological learning
and social carbon cost assumptions.
We have observed that adding socio-demographic variables to adoption models with NPV variables
does not significantly change the optimal subsidy schedule. For instance, at a learning rate (LR) of 15%
and social cost of carbon (SCC) of $45/ton, the optimal subsidy schedule starts at $217/kW and $146/kW
for the error function model with a single variable model and multi-variable model consisting of sociodemographic variables, respectively. At this LR and SCC, differences in optimal subsidy are more notable
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across different model formulations using similar explanatory variables. We found that the optimal
subsidies are zero for both single and multi-variable mixed log-linear and logit adoption models.
In the literature on energy system models and policy analysis frameworks, it is more common to see
sensitivity analysis in which the studies evaluate and compare outcomes using different values of input
variables. In regression-based studies, it is a standard practice to select different combinations of input
parameters to test the robustness of estimated coefficients. But it is far less common to explore the effects
of varying model formulations using similar input variables. In this study, we found that for the single
variable models consisting of only the NPV, at SCC of $85/ton, lowering the learning rate from 20% to
15% has reduced the optimal first-year subsidy by 96% for the logit demand model. These values were
27% and 56% for the error function and mixed log-linear models, respectively. This shows that the impact
of technology cost reduction assumption on optimal subsidy design depends on the model formulation
assumptions. Optimal policy design can be more sensitive to learning rate changes when the logit demand
function is used than the other models. A similar result is also observed for the multi-variable models
consisting of NPV and socio-demographic variables.
Often, researchers address uncertainty by adding model complexity through accounting for additional
factors thought to influence the outcomes. In our case, the single variable models employing the NPV
resulted in a declining subsidy. But, adding previous adoption variables to account for consumer
awareness of the technology had resulted in a qualitatively different outcome. In the case of the error
function and logit demand models, results suggest that government subsidies are no longer needed for
residential solar PVs at any sensible values of learning rate and carbon cost. On the other hand, for the
mixed log-linear model, the optimal subsidy is only an early investment by the government. This shows
that adding more variables can be problematic if the statistical significance of the NPV is masked due to
multicollinearity issues. In this case, it is also important to point out that the need for government support
depends on how strong its effect is on adoption. Results show that if the adoption curve is steeper as a
function of the NPV (or subsidy), the subsidy can stimulate and induce more adoption compared to the no
subsidy case, resulting in a higher net social benefit. But it would be hard to justify the subsidy if other
factors such as socio-demographic or prior adoptions are the main driving factors for adoption.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions
Governments have implemented different policies to promote the adoption of clean energy
technologies that can be used to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from electricity generation. Among
these policies, subsidies providing financial incentives to end-use consumers have become an important
policy approach to driving the adoption of clean energy technologies. This dissertation investigates
analytical methods to establish ideal government subsidy levels for future pathways that can result in
clean and sustainable energy generation. This study also provides a structured tool to analyze and identify
technology-specific attributes and modeling approaches that may affect socially optimal policy designs.
Chapter 2 develops an integrated framework that comprehensively analyzes the economic
justifications of clean energy technology subsidies and determines subsidy schedules that maximize social
benefits. The framework constitutes a model that accounts for adoption induced by a subsidy by
extrapolation from empirical data. The framework also considers that the adoption can induce cost
reductions by stimulating industry investments and learning. This is needed as many energy subsidies are
justified through their potential to develop the industry over time. A benefit-cost model is included in the
integrated framework to determine if the subsidy investment is in the public interest. We applied the
framework for residential solar PV technologies in the US. We found that considering technological
progress is a critical part of the justification of a public subsidy for these early-stage technologies. The
results also show that the subsidy for emerging technologies ought to start high and be tapered off
aggressively as prices fall. The study highlights that the effect of free riders and geographical
heterogeneity limits the net benefits of high subsidy levels once a technology has become competitive
enough to attract consumers at unsubsidized prices.
Chapter 3 presents a comparative assessment for optimal subsidies in residential solar PV and utilityscale wind technologies. While we find that the optimal government subsidy for residential solar PV
should decline over time, relatively constant optimal subsidy schedules are observed for utility wind. This
fundamental difference is analyzed through a simplified approach that provides analytical solutions to
optimal subsidy design modeling. This approach and the integrated framework developed in Chapter 2 are
used to identify three technological attributes that drive the qualitative differences observed in the policy
design of the two technologies. These include environmental benefits, price sensitivity of diffusion, and
technological cost reductions. The results show that environmental benefit is the primary justification for
wind technology subsidies, whereas technological progress benefits are the main element when justifying
subsidies for residential solar PVs. The fact that the subsidy targets two groups of consumers also has
further implications for the optimal subsidy difference between these two technologies. Wind technology
adaptors are more sensitive to price change and economic effectiveness induced by the subsidy than
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homeowners buying residential solar PV. The results of this chapter demonstrate that governments should
carefully implement technology specific policies accounting for the differences in technological
characteristics and justifications.
Chapter 4 evaluates the effects of uncertainties in adoption models on optimal policy design. We used
three model structures: an error function, a mixed log-linear regression, and a logit function. These
models are examined using a combination of single and multiple explanatory variables. The first case uses
the Net Present Value (NPV) of adopting a rooftop solar system over a 20-year period consisting of
government incentives, electricity cost, and solar energy potential. In addition to the economic gain,
multi-variable models are also considered, allowing us to account for other factors that can drive
adoption, including socio-demographic variables such as income, unemployment rate, population density,
and consumer awareness quantified using prior adoption rates. The models are fitted using historical
county-level data from three states, namely Arizona, California, and Massachusetts. Each adoption model
is then integrated into the techno-economic framework developed in Chapter 2 to analyze the variation in
optimal government policies. We have observed that adding socio-demographic variables did not
significantly change the optimal subsidy design for all three model configurations, but high variation is
observed across different models using similar variables. We also found that subsidies are not justified
when using prior adoption variables. These results imply that optimal subsidy designs can be sensitive to
adoption model structural formulation variable choices.
In our study, the technology progress model utilizes a national experience curve which is based on US
cumulative PV adoption and installed price. This assumes that the US adoption follows a similar growth
trend as the global adoption. Two alternative patterns of US versus rest-of-world adoption are possible.
First, rest-of-world adoption could be entirely independent from the US. This case could be modeled
through an exogenous forecast of global adoption. Second, adoption patterns among countries might
asymmetrically interact, e.g. one nation might choose to wait for subsidy efforts elsewhere to bear fruit
before investing in a technology. This case might be modeled with a game theory model. There are
practical and theoretical difficulties with modeling both the independent rest-of-world and interacting
policies cases. The independent rest-of-world case requires a plausible forecast of global adoption. The
interacting policies case faces the practical challenge of formulating a plausible game theory
representation of national subsidy decision-making processes. From a philosophical perspective, national
policy-making address global and local environmental challenges ought not to be contingent on the
actions of other nations.
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This study applied a benefit-cost analysis to determine the social net benefits of subsidizing clean
energy technologies. We estimated the monetized benefits from avoided emissions and damages from
conventional power plants because of the adoption of clean energy technologies. These types of policies
are analyzed over a long period and involve intergenerational discounting. For long-term public projects,
in which the costs and benefits represent the consumption profile changes from society’s perspective,
consumption interest rates or social rate of time preference is considered to be the appropriate discount
rate (Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, United States Government, 2021;
US EPA, 2010). This value differs from the rates used for private individuals and firms investments
which may account for capital return tax and investment risks (US EPA, 2010). In our base case analysis,
we used a 3% discount rate to estimate the net benefits of subsidizing clean energy technologies. This rate
is recommended for discounting intergenerational social projects and is determined using average
consumption interest rates observed over 30 years (IWG, 2021). This value is lower than the rates used
for private sectors, which are estimated using post-tax rates accounting for investment risks (Interagency
Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, United States Government, 2010).
Governments apply different policies to promote the use of clean energy technologies. These policies
are essential to reduce the negative externalities of fossil fuel consumption for electricity generation and
address energy security issues. But it is often seen that decision-makers implement a one size fits all
policy targeting different technologies. The results of this study show that the economic justifications and
efficiency of these policies depend on the specific characteristics of the technology, such as diffusion
patterns, technology cost reduction, and environmental benefits. The subsidy-driven dynamic interaction
among these characteristics can vary for different technologies calling for the need to design technology
specific policies.

In this study, we only consider one clean energy technology at a time when determining
optimal subsidies. The integrated framework can be modified to carry out an alternative analysis
that can optimize for multiple technologies. This type of analysis can inform the government on
how to allocate a limited budget to different technologies while maximizing national net benefits.
This dissertation also does not account for funding sources and does not put any constraint on
government spending. The scope of our study is also limited to one type of demand-pull policy
that directly affects the economics of technology adoption by homeowners or wind developers.
But governments can also apply other mechanisms for promoting R&Ds in clean energy
technologies.
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5.1 Policy Implications
In the US, federal and state legislators have passed financial incentives and regulatory policies to
support small and large-scale clean energy technologies such as wind, solar PVs, and electric vehicles.
Although the subsidies for these technologies are established through a political process, it is unclear how
the decisions are informed and what analytical tools are applied to identify efficient public spending.
Policymakers deciding on subsidy schedules promoting renewable technologies should investigate the
long-term costs and benefits to help inform that process. They should consider not only the environmental
benefits but also the complex interaction between the subsidy, diffusion patterns, and technology cost
trajectories.
The federal government implements a homogeneous subsidy that is equal across US states. But it is
important to consider that the performance and outcomes of such types of subsidies depend on the
geographical variations driven by renewable resource potential and the current energy grid mix. In this
study, we observed that national net benefits could increase when geographically differentiated subsidies
are applied for residential solar PV and utility-scale wind optimal incentive designs. These technologies
can displace a massive amount of environmental emissions in the Midwest region, which results from a
high proportion of coal-powered electricity generation. Optimal subsidies for these technologies are found
to be higher in these regions than in others. But this finding may reverse if clean energy technologies, for
e.g., electric vehicles and storage, have the potential to increase electricity generation from emissionsintensive power plants. Hence, analyzing the effects of subsidies of clean energy technologies accounting
for geographical variation and the energy-grid mix is essential.
The federal government continues to allocate a considerable amount of budget to provide incentives
for using residential clean energy technologies such as solar PV and electric vehicles. Policy mechanisms
such as tax incentives can reduce the cost of adopting these technologies for consumers. But the
government should also implement policies that specifically target low-income households, as the
technologies are still inaccessible for these communities due to the high cost. At state level, New York
has community solar programs for low- and moderate-income households and California offers solar
incentives for single and multifamily low-income housings. Similar policies can be adapted at the federal
level. In addition to this, it is also important to explore environmentally safe ways to handle renewable
energy equipment after its lifetime. Solar PVs and wind turbines have an average lifetime of 20 years.
The government should devise regulations for end-of-life management and policies that promote the
development of infrastructure for recycling and remanufacturing of these technologies.
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5.2 Limitations
There are a number of caveats to this work. First, the model carves out residential solar as a separate
piece of the energy system, but the grid context will evolve, influencing important variables such as
electricity prices and emissions factors. There are additional factors that we do not account for in this
study. Lifecycle emissions and end of life recycling of PV modules and other solar PV system
components are not evaluated in the benefit-cost model. Assessment of such factors requires a detailed
material component and environmental policy framework analysis which we consider to be out of scope
of this study. The benefit-cost analysis does not account for administrative and transaction costs of federal
subsidies. But we re-run our base case model assuming an additional overhead cost of 1-5% of
government spending and find results mostly unchanged. The optimal national flexibly subsidy schedule
starts at $575/kW and declines to $2/kW in 13 years (for 1% transaction cost) and the subsidy starts at
$534/kW and declines to $21/kW in 11 years (for 5% transaction cost) with net benefits of $0.95M and
$0.78M, respectively. Both of these scenarios adding administrative and transaction costs are similar to
our base case with starting subsidy of $585/kW, declining to $10/kW after 13 years.
The results of our analysis do not consider the effect of residential solar PV on the transmission and
distribution systems. Other studies estimate that for low diffusion levels, grid connected distributed PV
generation may result in avoided costs ranging between 0 – 0.2 ¢/kWh (Taylor et al., 2015), whereas high
levels of adoption incur a distribution system upgrade cost of about 0 – 0.04 $/W (Horowitz et al., 2018).
We consider two scenarios, one in which PV reduces transmission and distribution costs at the midpoint
of (Taylor et al 2015) and a second in which PV increases them, the midpoint of (Horowitz et al 2018).
We rerun the model for each scenario. If PV reduces transmission and distribution costs by 0.1 ¢/kWh,
the optimal national flexible subsidy schedule starts at $562/kW in 2018 and declines to $10/kW in 13
years, with a net benefit of $1,580M. If PV induces an additional $0.02/W in transmission and
distribution costs, the optimal national flexible subsidy starts at $603/kW and declines to $9/kW in 13
years, with a net benefit of $346M. In both cases the subsidy schedule does not change much, suggesting
that using literature values for the effects of PV on transmission and distribution do not significantly
affect model results. In addition, increased deployment of small-scale PV can affect wholesale power
prices, result in curtailment, and require additional storage in the electricity system. Our model indicates
that the share of total electricity from rooftop solar would reach to up to 17% in Hawaii and 15% in
California, levels that are probably manageable with known technologies.
This work is based on the integration of different models, each with their own limitations. First, with
regards to the overall scope of the model, note that the interaction of wind and solar with the rest of the
electricity grid is mediated through an exogenous electricity price. Within the scope of covered factors,
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the diffusion model developed for utility scale wind does not fit the historical empirical data as closely as
for residential solar (Williams et al., 2020). Second, our adoption model uses a single factor, i.e., the Net
Present Value, to determine adoption level. But utility scale wind developments can be affected by other
factors such as policy uncertainty and investor decisions, that are not fully accounted for in our model.
The revenues from clean energy technologies may also vary in the future depending on changes in net
metering policies and lower electricity prices for renewables. Lastly, the environmental benefit of clean
energy technologies is estimated via a social cost of carbon (base case = $45/ton) and use of the EASUIR
environmental risk model (Heo and Adams, 2015), though we note that the estimation of future carbon
price and emissions factors are uncertain.
5.3 Future works
The integrated model developed in this study can be adopted to evaluate optimal policy directives for
other technologies, such as electric vehicles. The analytical perspectives demonstrated in this work can be
used by researchers to integrate the effects of consumer adoption and technological progress and
estimates net benefits from subsidizing other emerging technologies. Further study is also required to
analyze uncertainties in technological progress models. One area can be to compare one-factor and twofactor experience curves consisting of R&D investments. This type of study may require a systematic
approach to overcome multi-collinearity issues and private research data limitations in the two-factor
model.
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